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A TECHNOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE ARMS RACE
Lee Kovarsky*
The “technological arms race” has recently emerged as a 
vogue-ish piece of legal terminology. Despite the pervasiveness of arms-
race talk, however, scholarship has quite conspicuously failed to explore 
the phenomenon systematically. What are “technological” arms races? 
In what circumstances should we expect them to occur? Does the recent 
spike in scholarly attention actually reflect their novelty? Are they 
always inefficient? How do they differ from military ones? What role can 
legal institutions play in slowing them down?
In this Article I seek to answer these questions. I argue that 
copyright enforcement and self-help are substitutable means of 
regulating access to creative assets and that each of these strategies 
works effectively against a particular audience profile. Authors can most 
cost-effectively manage access through a mixture of these two tactics. 
Given the attributes of the parties competing over use of and access to 
intellectual assets—authors and consumers—one should expect to 
observe sustained racing behavior. Such racing constitutes an exercise in 
inefficient wealth-redistribution, eroding the benefits of authors’ 
traditional ability to choose the lowest-cost, most effective mix of 
copyright enforcement and self-help. Although the proposition that 
copyright protection substitutes for self–help is not a new one, the 
precise ways in which it does so—as well as the magnitude of the 
potential inefficiencies associated with arms races—remains under-
theorized.
Legal rules should seek to minimize wasteful investment in 
protection and circumvention measures, but citing the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") as the first institutional attempt to 
do so is misleading. Courts and legislatures have had to confront racing 
behavior over a variety of intangible assets—copyrightable ideas, 
patented inventions, and unprotected information. This sample of 
institutional responses reveals an identifiable pattern for approaching 
technological arms races, one to which the DMCA largely conforms.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Given the recent explosion in consumption of digital content, 
intellectual property scholarship has increasingly focused on how self-
help (non-legal modes of regulating access to and use of creative assets)1
figures in the decisionmaking of authors and distributors, to whom I refer 
collectively as content-providers.2 This commentary yields at least two 
relatively incontrovertible but as-yet unconnected propositions. First, the 
literature has demonstrated that self-help represents a viable alternative 
to legal modes of exclusion generally (by which I mean mechanisms for 
restricting use of and access to an asset), and intellectual property law in 
particular.3 Second, it has established that, under certain conditions, self-
help can initiate wasteful “arms races” between providers and consumers 
of creative assets.4 This Article seeks to accomplish what the scholarship 
has quite conspicuously failed to do—establish a rigorous, logical 
relationship between these two phenomena.
My over-arching purpose is to elucidate the connection between 
these two ideas, and I go about this task in two ways. First, I explore the 
more general relationship between copyright law and arms racing. In so 
doing, I borrow methodology from international relations literature in 
order to predict the frequency and intensity of arms races over intangible 
assets. Second, I position that phenomenon’s most conspicuous 
institutional response, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 
in the broader context of legal rules governing a variety of intangible 
assets.
Part I is more of a synthesis of pertinent scholarship than are 
Parts II and III. 5 I will develop the idea that copyright and self-help 
represent substitute tactics for excluding consumers from unauthorized 
access to and use of a creative work (and the one oft-overlooked 
1
 These are sometimes called “technological protection measures” (TPMs). See June M. Besek, 
Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, 
Media, and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 391-92 (2004). I resist this terminology 
because it seems to inevitably imply that there needs to be some sort of circuitry involved.
2 See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (And Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
217 (1996) (exploring analogies to real property in cyberspace).
3 See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure And Prisoner's Dilemma In 
Intellectual Property 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 856 n.13 (1992) (“[I]f a policymaker were 
able to … decide that fencing was in fact more expensive than setting up and enforcing a 
system of intellectual property rights, that might justify adopting a copyright-like law even in 
the absence of author market failure.”).
4 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 172-73 
(1999); Hardy, supra note 2, at 251.
5
 The exception is Section I.C, which discusses the factors driving a content provider to select 
a given mix of copyright enforcement and self-help.
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corollary that one function of copyright is to displace the need for self-
help). It will explore in detail the variables driving a content-provider’s 
selection of exclusionary tactics, arguing that two variables, both relating 
to the ease of producing unauthorized substitutes for the creative asset, 
figure most prominently in that decision. Part II will explore carefully 
one of the more prominent developments of the digital era—the 
technological arms race. I will borrow methodology from international 
relations theory to structure analysis of technological arms races over 
copyrightable assets, presenting more rigorously both the conditions 
under which such races occur and those under which one may expect a 
particular side to “win.” I will argue that the primary harm of 
technological arms races is that they cannibalize the benefits associated 
with a given content-provider’s ability to employ selectively a variety of 
legal and non-legal exclusionary strategies. Finally, Part III will argue 
that the most recent Congressional response to digital piracy, the 
allegedly “unprecedented” or “revolutionary” DMCA, actually fits very 
comfortably within a series of judicial and legislative reactions to arms 
races over a variety of intangible assets.
I. THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF COPYRIGHT AND SELF-HELP
A. The Conventional Logic of Copyright
Copyrightable ideas are one member of a set of assets that 
economists call “public goods.”6 Public goods exhibit two distinctive 
characteristics—(1) non-rivalrousness, meaning that one person’s 
consumption of an asset does not diminish its availability for another,7
and (2) non-excludability, meaning that the producer of an asset cannot 
6
 The concept of “public goods” derives largely from the work of Nobel laureate Paul 
Samuelson. See Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON & 
STAT. 332, 335-56 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of 
Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure 
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON & STAT. 387 (1954). Writings are generally 
considered public goods. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 n.4 
(1970). Kenneth Arrow is usually credited with noting the public goods problem in intellectual 
property. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare And The Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962).
7
 For the canonical statement of nonrivalry, See Arrow, supra note 6, at 614-17. This 
proposition appears endlessly in intellectual property literature. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, An 
Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 
2065-66 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2012 (2000); 
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1700 
(1988).
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restrict its benefits to those who purchase it.8 More colloquially, a public 
good is one with benefits that cost little to provide to and cost a lot to 
restrict from an extra person.9 Ideas exhibit non-rivalrousness because 
one person’s consumption of an idea does not diminish its value to 
others. They exhibit non-excludability because (absent some means of 
legal exclusion or self-help) a content-provider cannot restrict an idea’s 
benefits to those who purchase it. I use the term “content-provider” 
because it includes authors and distributors of copyrightable works, both 
of which make the choice with which I concern myself in this Article—
that between copyright enforcement and self -help.
Absent some corrective mechanism, the private sector under-
produces ideas because, whereas the non-rivalrousness of an idea 
suggests it should be produced and disseminated prolifically, its non-
excludability means that content-providers will generally find themselves 
unable to recoup a return on it in the market. Copyright represents the 
state’s attempt to correct for this market failure by defining property 
rights in original expression.10
Allowing content-providers to exclude potential competition and 
charge supra-competitive prices11 means that certain consumers cannot 
8
 Many textbooks now discuss the public goods problem exclusively in terms of free riding 
and excludability. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 641 (1989).
9 See Stigweb: The Stiglitz Internet Study Site, at 
http://www.wwnorton.com/college/econ/stiglitz/glossp.htm (last visited July 27, 2004) 
(defining a public good as one “that costs little or nothing for an extra individual to enjoy, and 
that costs a great deal to prevent an extra individual from enjoying”). The two classic (but 
nonetheless disputed) examples of public goods are national defense and lighthouses. National 
defense is considered a non-rivalrous good because, having already provided it for one person, 
the producer (usually the government) can provide it to another at little to no incremental 
expense. See, e.g., PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 8, at 638; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 87, 99-103 (1986); Breyer, supra note 6, at 281 n.4. 
Much the same logic applies to lighthouses. See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in 
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974).
10
 Many governments induce the private production of public goods by creating and 
delineating property rights over the good. See STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED 
GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 17-20 (1991); James M. Buchanan & Milton Z. 
Kafoglis, A Note on Public Goods Supply, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 403 (1963). Copyright is itself 
an attempt to correct for just such a market failure. For a general discussion of market failures, 
See Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation 
Analysis, 22 J.L. & ECON. 107, 107-12 (1979) (discussing nonmarket failure and the four 
classic types of market failures).
Government can respond to market failures in at least two ways. First, it can more 
carefully delineate property. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960). Second, it can provide the good itself, such as is generally the case with national 
defense.
11
 By supra-competitive prices I mean prices that exceed marginal cost, the price an author 
would have to set if he or she did not have exclusive rights to control access to and use of a 
creative asset. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free 
Lee Kovarsky Pre Submission Draft, 23-Feb-04
A Technological Theory of the Arms Race 6
transact even though they may value the incremental copy more than the 
sellers do.12 Economists refer to these foregone transactions as “dead-
weight loss.”13 It is the tension between, on the one hand, providing 
sufficient creative incentives and, on the other, minimizing dead weight 
loss, that animates much of the contemporary controversy in copyright 
law.14 The moniker “incentives-access paradigm” has come to refer to 
copyright’s uneasy attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of 
retaining sufficient creative incentives and allowing socially desirable 
access.15 An economist might say that copyright law seeks to minimize 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2003). But cf. Edmund W. Kitch, 
Elementary And Persistent Errors In The Economic Analysis Of Intellectual Property, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730-38 (2000) (noting that not all copyrights enable supra-competitive 
pricing). 
Copyright enables authors to charge a supra-competitive price for creative works by 
constraining arbitrage opportunities in secondary markets. Suppose, for example, that an 
author pens a copyrightable novel and sells it as an e-book to one consumer for $10. Absent 
copyright protection, when the author tries to sell the book to another consumer for the same 
price, there is nothing to stop the first consumer from under-pricing that offer by replicating 
the copy he originally purchased from the author. (Under the first sale doctrine, the purchaser 
of copyrighted material can resell the physical copy of that material. The purchaser may also 
lend or rent that physical copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000)). In fact, an inability to control 
secondary distribution would prevent the author from being able to charge any price above the 
marginal cost of creating a copy of the work. Stated more rigorously, allowing third parties to 
under-price an original author forces the market price down to the marginal cost of producing 
the additional copy—which, for most digital works, is close to nothing. 
If an author cannot charge a price that exceeds the marginal cost of the copy, then she can 
never amortize the fixed cost of producing the first copy of the work. And if she can’t expect 
to recover the fixed costs of creating the work, why would she create it in the first place? 
Anybody who doubts the privileged status copyright protection enjoys in generating incentives 
for creative production need look no further than Lars Ulrich, Metallica’s self-appointed 
ambassador to the business world who, in 2001, spearheaded an all-out legal and public 
relations assault on the filesharing network Napster. See J. Beyer Sims, Mutiny on the Net: 
Ridding P2P Pirates of Their Booty, 52 EMORY L.J. 1907, 1908-09 (2003).
12 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42 
(2002).
13 See id.
14 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (describing 
copyright as requiring “a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the 
control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s 
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.”); 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 135 (3rd ed. 2000); Burk, supra
note 4, at 133 (“[T]he incentive to create the work is purchased at the expense of restricted 
availability….”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (“Striking the correct balance between access and 
incentives is the central problem in copyright law. For copyright law to promote economic 
efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits 
from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of 
administering copyright protection.”).
15
 Copyright is a legal device for excluding market participants other than the content-provider
(and those she licenses), and the need for those entities to be able to recover the fixed costs of 
their creative investments is easily the most frequently advanced justification for copyright 
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the difference between the content-provider’s expected return on the 
work and the fixed cost of creation, so as both to minimize the dead-
weight loss and to retain sufficient incentives to produce the creative 
asset.16
B. Copyright and Self-Help as Substitutes
As one might expect with most canonical legal theories, the 
incentives-access paradigm’s ivory façade has drawn heavy fire.17
Arguments regarding what copyright is “really about” abound,18 but the 
incentives-access paradigm endures as the favored justification among 
scholars, including the nine that matter most.19 Although I ultimately cast 
protection. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212, 226-36 (2004). 
16 See Cooter and Ulen, supra note 14, at 135; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 527 (1999) (“[T]he concept of a restricted 
copyright [is] one that protects a copyrighted work to the extent necessary to induce creation, 
but no more.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868 (1990); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1996) (“Any copyright protection beyond that 
necessary to compensate the author for lost opportunities would generate no additional 
incentive to create and would discourage production of additional copies even when the cost of 
producing those copies was less than the price consumers would be willing to pay.”).
17 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 11 (arguing that the incentives access paradox is not really a 
paradox because it does not take into account the economics of product differentiation).
18 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996) (suggesting that copyright protection protects democratic societies from the 
dangers of government patronage); Tim Wu, Copyrights Communications Policy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 278 (forthcoming 2004) (contending that much of what is in title 17 represents 
conflict-specific compromise on communications policy).
19
 The Constitution states that Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this clause to mean that copyright represents an incentive for authors to produce 
creative works. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207 (2003), Fogerty v. Fantasy, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984)) (“We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has 
authorized, while ‘intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the 
provision of a special reward,’ are limited in nature and must ultimately serve the public 
good.”); Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co, 449 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (“To 
[the end of promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts], copyright assures authors the 
right in their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by a work.”); Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985) (“[I]t should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine 
of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges … are neither unlimited 
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant … is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors by the provision of a special reward, and 
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive 
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my lot with the paradigm’s apologists, whether the relationship between 
self-help and copyright enforcement is consistent with that theory is not 
my primary concern. I instead seek to explore how arms races create 
waste,20 irrespective of the degree to which one may cast the specific 
inefficiencies as conforming to the orthodox copyright theory.
Copyright enforcement is only one of several exclusionary 
tactics content-providers may use to charge supra-competitive prices in 
exchange for use and access rights.21 If one assumes that content-
providers are economically motivated,22 then they should favor copyright 
enforcement only when it is superior to other modes of excluding 
unauthorized use and access. I use the terms “unauthorized access” and 
“unauthorized use” together to refer generally to any unauthorized 
consumption (whether it be use or access) of a copyrightable asset, as 
well was unauthorized use of that asset as an input to follow-on creation.
23
Although a content-provider has several alternatives that fit 
under the umbrella of “legal” protection (such as shrink-wrap licenses or 
trespass law),24 for now assume that by the term “legal protection” I am 
referring to copyright enforcement. Self-help can also take any number 
of forms,25 but perhaps the single most readily identifiable and most 
contemporarily relevant is encryption of digital content.26
control has expired.”); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (noting the 
Constitution outlines both the goal to be achieved and the means to achieve it). For that matter, 
legislative history suggests that Congress may have expressly considered the incentives-access 
idea when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1909:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress … is not based upon 
any natural right … but upon the ground that the welfare of the public 
will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by 
securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their 
writings.
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1909).
20 See Section II.A, infra.
21 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 223.
22 See David Chang, Selling The Market-Driven Message: Commercial Television, Consumer 
Sovereignty, And The First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 451, 528 (2000).
23
 Copyright is ordinarily characterized as an attempt to provide incentives for creation and 
distribution. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 793 (2003) (“If 
one were to look for an overriding intent vis-à-vis copyright, it is surely that it creates 
incentives to produce and distribute public goods that otherwise would be under produced. 
This is unquestionably the overriding purpose of the law as expressed, explained, and 
elaborated by the Constitution, Congress, and the Supreme Court.”) (internal citations 
omitted). For the sake of simplicity, however, I have omitted discussion of the distribution 
incentive, although much of the analysis as applied to authors applies with equal, if not more 
force, to distributors.
24 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 226.
25
 Again, I eschew the term “technological protection measure” in favor of “self-help” because 
the former term obscures the fact that many protection measures are quite crude. The most 
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There is a noteworthy distinction between speaking in terms of 
the “substitutability” of copyright and self-help from the perspective of a 
government and that from the perspective of an individual content-
provider. I discuss the significance of the decision from each of these
perspectives,27 but the choice facing individual actors (whether to 
enforce a copyright or use self-help) should be considered separately 
from the institutional choice facing legislatures and courts (how to set up 
rules encouraging individual actors to make the most socially desirable 
choices). In this Part, when I discuss the substitutability of copyright and 
self-help, I refer exclusively to the menu of options facing individual 
actors.
An individual content-provider has at least three viable strategies 
when considering how to release a work. To be fair, these strategies are 
actually points on a continuum, but representing them as three discreet 
choices simplifies my descriptive task considerably.28 First, a content-
provider could create the work and “protect” the document from certain 
kinds of use and copying (call this creation with self-help).29 Second, she 
could rely entirely on copyright enforcement to dictate behavior with 
respect to use and copying (creation without self-help).30 Third, she 
could not create the work at all (no creation).
common forms of digital self help, however, are digital watermarks, encryption, and digital 
rights management (“DRM”) technology. See Besek, supra note 1, at 444-49. These protection 
and the associated circumvention measures are assuming a larger and larger rule, as they have 
prominently figured in the distribution of some of the most financially successful and popular 
media in recent memory. See, e,g. note 69, infra.
26 See Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 107-08 
(Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
27
 For the discussion of the choice faced by the individual actor, See infra notes 29 to 41 and 
accompanying text. For the discussion of the choice face by institutional actors, see Part III, 
infra.
28
 The following discussion assumes the level of copyright enforcement is constant; in other 
words, it assumes that content-providers could condition their creation on an ability to re-up 
copyright enforcement.
29
 The choice of protection obviously lies along a spectrum from investment in minimal 
protection to investment in more extravagant protection. In reality, then, a content-provider 
faces an almost infinite number of options: create (or distribute, for distributors), do not create, 
create with low intensity protection, create with slightly higher intensity protection, etc. Again, 
it is important to note this simplification but incorporating it into the explanation would render 
the idea too unwieldy for this paper.
30
 Strictly speaking, there is really no conceptual baseline for “no protection.” If one believes 
that protection includes things manuscripts through the mail in opaque envelopes, it becomes 
clear that what we think of as “no protection” are nothing more nontechnological protection 
measures that have been incorporated into the norms of creation and distribution. Nonetheless, 
the commonsense meaning of “no protection” is a sufficient definition for the purposes of 
understanding this explanation.
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Historically, scholars have depicted content-providers as facing a 
binary choice between creation without self-help and no creation.
Copyright scholarship does not depict self-help as an option upon which 
content providers historically relied. Content-providers were presented as 
having an abridged menu of options—one that omitted the possibility of 
creation with self-help—for at least three reasons. First, some argue that 
content-providers rarely pursued creation with self-help because the costs 
individual actors bore in developing and deploying effective self-help 
devices remained high relative to those they bore in association with 
copyright enforcement.31 In the words of one noted copyright scholar:
Until very recently, a copyright holder had no means to instruct a 
book that it should sprout wings and fly back to its publisher 
after it had been read N times, crumble into unusability on a date 
certain, or reveal only indecipherable script until a designated 
reader shouted, “Open sesame!”32
Second, content-providers infrequently opted for creation with 
self-help because the high costs of copying severely limited the need for 
non-legal complements to legal exclusion (in other words, content-
31 See Besek, supra note 1, at 391-92. With respect to the Internet, technological solutions can 
be implemented at any of several logical layers: at the level of the copyrighted work, the 
operating system, or the network. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 78 (1995).
The advent of new, inexpensive means of controlling access to creative works—digital 
barbed wire—dramatically reduces the costs of fencing off creative material and calibrating 
access. See Burk, supra note 4, at 147; Netanel, supra note 18, at 285. For example, the Secure 
Digital Music Initiative (“SDMI”), see Secure Digital Music Initiative, http://www.sdmi.org 
(last visited Aug. 8, 2004), and the Content Protection System Architecture (“CPSA”), see 
Content Protection System Architecture: A Comprehensive Framework for Content Protection, 
http://www.4centity.com/data/tech/cpsa/cpsa081.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2004), each represent 
rights management initiatives that, if utilized, may exclude certain types of use far more 
effectively than does enforcement through court action. See Loren, supra note 82. The most 
prominent example of such barbed wire is DRM technology. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The 
Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003) 
(discussing the relationship between DRM and privacy).
I highlight the importance of the individual actor’s perspective because what drives the 
selection of exclusionary mode is not the cost of exclusion, but the cost of exclusion borne by 
the actor making the choice. Irrespective of the degree to which exclusion costs are 
concentrated in the actor making the choice between exclusionary modes, however, non-legal 
protection measures were, for some time, prohibitively costly.
32
 Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
587, 601 (1997).
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providers simply did not need self-help because copying was too 
expensive).33 Mark Stefik puts it quite succinctly:
Arguments about fair use for digital works sometimes tacitly 
(and incorrectly) assume that publishing risks in the digital 
medium are similar to those in the paper medium. However, 
while it is … unlikely that an infringer will make and distribute 
thousands of paper copies of a work, he or she can copy and mail 
a thousand digital copies with a single keystroke at no expense 
whatsoever.34
Whereas the first two reasons suggest the binary model is more a 
practical simplification than an error, the third attacks it more directly. 
Commentators failed to discern instances where a content-provider in 
fact deployed a “protection measure” because those protection measures 
did not look much like “technology” at all. Self-help instead generally 
assumed the form of specialized intermediaries.35
These intermediaries took the form of “the movie theater, video 
store, broadcast licensee’s studio, or music store down the street.”36 This 
dynamic, of course, derives largely from the other two—creators and 
distributors favored these “tollbooths”37 both because they were efficient, 
coordinated self-help and because they imposed significant copying costs 
on potential infringers. While characterizing these intermediaries as 
“substitutes” for legal exclusion does not entirely capture their social or 
economic significance, understanding the role they play in constraining 
unauthorized use and access remains important. A public library controls 
dissemination of potential market substitutes by requiring that people 
return books after they read them and movie theatres do the same by 
presenting films to audiences without distributing physical copies. Many 
commentators are therefore guilty of too readily characterizing self-help 
as the unique byproduct of sophisticated digital locks, neglecting the 
33
 The absence of perfect digital copying devices (and other perfect or near-perfect ones) made 
illegal copying less attractive to consumers, and the loss associated with creation without self-
help was smaller. See Besek, supra note 1, at 391. Cf. Hardy, supra note 2, at 235-36 
(identifying an inverse relationship between cost of copying devices and incidence of self-
help). Consumers could not download a film or copy a novel at the click of a button, so authors 
relied less on self-help for maintaining supra-competitive prices. As the costs of copying 
plummet, however, the stakes for authors rise because arbitrage opportunities for consumers 
increase.
34 See MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE 96-97.
35 See id. Also, for example, the strategy used for The Matrix release.
36
 Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 422 (1999).
37 See id.
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presence of more conventional institutions that perform largely the same 
function.
For the sake of explanatory simplicity I have thus far described 
the interaction between copyright and self-help as though the two are 
mutually exclusive. While the two are substitutes in a strict economic 
sense—an increase in the price of one will increase demand for the 
other—38content-providers deploy both modes together all of the time. 
As long as the return on a particular mode of exclusion is positive,39
content-providers should be expected to deploy it. In light of the recent 
technological developments altering the cost structure of protection and 
circumvention, the choice between self-help and copyright enforcement 
has assumed greater significance.
A content-provider’s incentive to deploy protection measures 
varies inversely with her return on copyright enforcement. In a world 
with no copyright protection, self-help would be the only means of 
constraining unauthorized use and access; and, in world where a 
copyright conferred complete exclusionary power, self-help would be 
unnecessary. We occupy a point on the legal continuum somewhere in 
between these two poles—copyright protection is available but 
incomplete and, even for those things that it purports to protect, 
enforcement is imperfect. Copyright enforcement and self-help are 
substitutes, and where traditional copyright provides only low-value 
protection, the incentives to pursue creation with self-help remain.
From the perspective of a content-provider, one should 
conceptualize two distinct elements as comprising the “legal force” of 
copyright law—scope and compliance. When copyright entitlements 
capture a content-provider’s every conceivable financial interest and 
when compliance with those rules is complete a creator will not deploy 
self-help (because such measures provide no marginal exclusion). 
Although (arguably) copyright scope has not undergone revolutionary 
changes over the last several decades,40 the advent of the digital medium 
has certainly precipitated a dramatic decline in compliance.41
38 ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS 19-20 (3d ed. 1991).
39 See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option For Mass Tort 
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 866 n.71 (2002) (citing ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL R. 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 184 (4th ed. 1998)). For a more precise statement of the 
conditions in equilibrium, see infra note 47.
40
 In the sense that copyright continues to protect works that are authored, original, and fixed. 
Moreover, the DMCA does not purport to alter the existing scope of copyright protection. See 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2000).
41 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 296 (2002) (“As the costs of 
copying decrease and more individuals are able to afford the technology necessary to copy, 
one can assume that there will be a greater number of potential copiers. So even though the 
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Response to this phenomenon may take the form of either 
increased self-help or increased copyright enforcement. Identifying the 
variables driving this response represents a central concept in the rest of 
this Article—the remainder of Part I will explore why an individual 
content-provider may favor one exclusionary mode over the other (or a 
specific mix of legal and non-legal exclusionary devices) and Part III 
will consider the related institutional responses. 
C. Selecting Exclusionary Strategies
In a recent Yale Law Journal article, Pamela Samuelson and 
Suzanne Scotchmer criticize the DMCA for incentivizing shoddy 
encryption.42 Why, they ask, would we want content-providers to utilize 
inferior protection measures? My answer, that primitive self-help is 
desirable for assets consumed by assets for certain audience profiles,43
requires a more nuanced understanding of self-help’s comparative 
advantages. For now I seek merely to lay a theoretical foundation for my 
ultimate answer to Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer. Part III 
explores their claim in the specific context of the DMCA.44 I focus now 
more generally on the factors that drive content-providers to favor self-
help. 
These factors together predict how likely, given that a content-
provider must secure a return on her creative labor, dissemination of an 
copying costs for initial distributors will decrease as well, they will be forced to compete with 
a greater number of copiers and copies.”).
42 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse-
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1641 (2002).
43
 Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer may have even alluded to this dynamic 
unintentionally. In their evaluation of the effect of the DMCA on ant circumvention 
technology, Samuelson and Scotchmer examine both its effect on “[e]xpenditures on technical 
protection measures for content-providers” and “wasted costs,” with the latter presumably 
incurred by content producers and distributors during an “arms race” with content-consumers. 
Id. at 1639 tbl. 4, 1641. They, however, concede that “in some sense” all costs are “wasted” in 
that they would be unnecessary were content-consumers entirely compliant with the copyright 
laws. See id. at 1641. The authors likely insist on putting the “in some sense” gloss on the 
status of technical protection measures because they presume that one hundred percent 
copyright compliance is unlikely and that some residual circumvention may always necessitate 
anticircumvention. Although Samuelson and Scotchmer do not furnish a useful means of 
distinguishing between technology that is “really” wasteful and that which is merely wasteful 
in “some sense” my intuition is that they mean to imply that the latter is comprised of those 
measures designed to prevent copying by unsophisticated circumventors. They do not, 
however, seem to openly embrace the idea that the substitutability of technology for copyright 
depends on the type of people that you are talking about protecting against. See id. (“We 
contend that if Congress wants to strengthen criminal penalties for copyright infringement, 
then it should do it straightforwardly, rather than through the back door of the DMCA.”).
44 See infra notes 170-187.
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associated end-product is to furnish consumers with potential market 
substitutes for the original asset. In this Part I argue that, with respect to 
copyrightable assets, the volume and mix of exclusionary strategies (1) 
on the inherent complexity of reverse-engineering that asset from its 
associated end-product, and (2) on the sophistication of the “audience” 
against which exclusionary measures would be directed. By “audience” I 
mean the set of potential infringers, follow-on creators, and consumers of 
the intellectual asset.45
 Entitlement-owners opt for crude technological exclusion all of 
the time. For example, landowners continue to use short wooden fences 
or barbed wire to exclude others from real property. Both trespass law 
and the fences prevent people from making unauthorized use of the land. 
The interesting property (and copyright) question is why a content-
provider settles on a specific mix of barbed-wire fences, trespass law, 
security guards, and any number of other exclusionary tactics.46
Content-providers will generally seek to maximize the value of 
their mix of legal protection and self-help, just as do landowners. In other 
words, they are most likely to rely on the lowest-cost, highest-return mix 
of exclusionary tactics. A content-provider will devote resources to 
different kinds of fencing in a way that should come as little surprise to 
those with a background in economics. Content-providers will select a 
mix of self-help and copyright enforcement such that the returns on an 
additional dollar of each exclusionary tactic are equivalent.47 A content-
provider does not want to waste exclusionary resources enforcing laws 
where self-help is more efficient, and vice-versa. As the marginal 
benefits of self-help increase relative to those of copyright enforcement, 
45
 Several scholars have recently undertaken a more careful parsing of what I call the 
“audience” for an intellectual asset. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and 
Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 489-95 (2004) (dividing audience into avoiders, transactors, 
and builders); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1141- 47 (2003) (dividing audience into purchasers, successors in interest, 
third party enforcers, and violators in general).
46
 The “fencing” metaphor now crops of frequently in copyright literature. See, e.g., Benkler, 
supra note 36, 420 (“Why is a prohibition on circumvention a restriction on speech? Why is it 
anything but a rule against picking locks? After all, one might say, the anticircumvention 
provision does not say that you cannot read a work or quote it in a critical review. It is a rule 
about using decryption software, not about accessing information. It says no more than, if the 
owner has set up a fence, you cannot break down the fence.”); Smith, supra note 45,  at 1175 
(“In the case of land, fences and other boundaries must be easily processed by a lay 
audience—anyone might stray onto the land—but, in the case of patents and the possibility of 
a nonexpert inadvertently ‘trespassing’ on a patent is less likely. Highly detailed and patent-
specific information is not only indispensable, but the limited audience of potential violators 
can be expected to process it.”).
47
 To be more precise (but perhaps more confusing), the marginal rate of subjective 
substitution between self-help and copyright enforcement will be equal to their price ratio. See 
W. JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 138-39 (4th ed. 1931).
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one would expect to observe content-providers shifting their limited 
resources accordingly.
The question that logically follows from the preceding 
observations is, quite colloquially, what is copyright law good at, and 
what is self-help good at? For copyrightable assets, two factors largely 
determine the volume and mix of exclusionary investment:48 (1) the 
inherent complexity of reverse-engineering the asset from the associated 
end-product (the asset’s “inherent reverse-engineerability,” holding the 
audience’s sophistication constant) and (2) the technological 
sophistication of potential consumers,49 infringers,50 and follow-on 
innovators (the capacity of an audience to reverse-engineer an asset, 
holding the asset’s inherent reverse-engineerability constant).51 With 
respect to (1), the more difficult an asset is to reverse engineer for its 
associated end product, the more likely a content-provider is to invest 
heavily in some form of exclusion and,52 with respect to (2), the less 
sophisticated the audience, the more likely a content-provider is to use 
the those exclusionary resources on self-help.53 If an asset is distributed 
48
 Trade secrecy changes the equation some-what, but that is rarely an option for copyrightable 
assets.
49
 This group encompasses those who merely wish to use or avoid the good subject to the 
appropriate legal restrictions.
50
 This group encompasses those that wish to gain unauthorized access to the good.
51
 This group encompasses those that wish to use the good as a creative input to the generation 
of a follow-on good. It maps roughly on to Clarisa Long’s category of “builders.” See Long, 
supra note 45, at 494.
52
 Another way of stating this argument is that where the asset in question bears a complicated 
relationship to the end-product, most of the infringement is going to be facilitated by 
“sophisticated circumventors” who are more responsive to legal penalties than they are to self-
help.
53
 One should distinguish between the relative and absolute desirability of legal protection. The 
desirability of self-help might increase, in an absolute sense, with the sophistication of an 
asset’s audience but, on average, such circumstances its desirability increases less than does 
that of copyright enforcement. The following diagram might most cogently present the 
relationship between the two variables and investment in exclusion:
Lee Kovarsky Pre Submission Draft, 23-Feb-04
A Technological Theory of the Arms Race 16
to a highly sophisticated audience capable of reverse-engineering the 
asset irrespective of its complexity, then self-help is less desirable than if 
the audience is unsophisticated.
With respect to the first variable, traditionally copyrightable 
assets are generally easy to reverse-engineer from their associated end-
products and therefore necessitate significant exclusionary investment in 
order to maintain supra-competitive pricing.54 Furnishing someone with a 
copy of a content-provider’s novel, absent some sort of exclusionary 
mechanism, furnishes that consumer with a market substitute for the 
asset itself (the expression in the novel).55 Such circumstances frustrate 
efforts to maintain supra competitive pricing for the novel because 
consumers can easily generate substitutes for that expression by making 
replicates of their physical (or electronic) copies. 
For stories and similar kinds of creative assets, creators may not 
exclude through secrecy (a form of self-help) because securing a return 
depends on their audience obtaining what is essentially a copy of the 
asset itself. One can hardly conceive of, for example, a commercially 
successful record whose musical contents must remain tightly guarded 
under lock and key.56
Inherent Reverse
Engineerability
Audience
Sophistication
HIGH
LOW
LOW
HIGH
Volume of
Exclusionary
Investment
Volume of
Exclusionary
Investment
Volume of
Exclusionary
Investment
Volume of
Exclusionary
Investment
Fraction Devoted to
Self-Help
Fraction Devoted to
Self-Help
Fraction Devoted to
Self-Help
Fraction Devoted to
Self-Help
Medium
Higher
High
Lower
Medium
Lower
Low
Higher
54
 This generalization obviously excepts software.
55
 Copyright law actually grants to the consumer a limited right to market substitutes. The 
“first-sale doctrine” allows the owner of a particular copy to, “without the authority of the 
copyright owner, [] sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy….” See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(a) (2000). The first-sale doctrine, however, does not entitle a consumer to distribute 
anything other than her physical copy. See id.
56
 In order for a listener to derive benefit from the asset she must receive a physical copy of the 
record. That record will disclose a perfect copy of the asset itself (forget for a moment the 
Copyright Act’s differential treatment of musical compositions and sound recordings, See 17 
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Certain intellectual assets, however, do not necessitate 
circulation to capture a return (and hence their inherent reverse-
engineerability is low). For these types of assets, inventors and content 
providers are more likely to rely on secrecy because audiences need not 
have unobstructed access to the actual asset in order to make use of it. 
For example, creators of patentable industrial processes need not 
circulate the processes themselves to earn a return on their inventive 
labor; they need circulate only the process’s associated end-product.57
That is not to say that all patentable assets enjoy such an attenuated 
relationship to their associated end-products. For example, one could 
hardly imagine Theophilus von Kannel securing his return on the 
revolving door without disclosing the mechanical specifications of his 
idea directly to those purchasing it.58
With respect to the second variable, the sophistication of the 
audience against which exclusionary tactics are directed, self-help is a 
more effective means of constraining accidental or inept copying—
copying engaged in by “unsophisticated circumventors.” An 
unsophisticated circumventor is a content-consumer or a follow-on 
content-provider that would not infringe the protected asset but for either 
her ignorance of the law or the ease with which she may acquire 
infringing material. 
Consider the analogy to wooden fences. They signal to legally 
ignorant but law-abiding people where public property ends and where 
private property begins. With respect to these people, extravagant self-
help would represent an additional cost without a corresponding benefit. 
Building state-of-the-art fences—and state-of-the-art encryption—is not 
desirable because it represents a gratuitous protection expenditure with 
respect to unsophisticated circumventors.59 Stationing sentinels in 
twenty-yard increments around the perimeter of a chicken farm would 
hardly be worth the cost. In the copyright context crude technological 
fences are generally sufficient to prevent “accidental” unauthorized uses 
of copyrightable assets. They might, for example, deal effectively with 
U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000)), a copy that may spawn perfect or near perfect substitutes for that 
asset, depending on the musical format.
57
 See, for example, the discussion of trade secrets in Subsection III.B.5, infra.
58
 He patented it on August 7, 1888. See Cynthia Blair, 1899: NYC’s First Revolving Door 
Installed in Times Square Restaurant, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), at 
http://www.nynewsday.com/features/custom/ithappened/newyork/ny-ihiny061504story.
htmlstory (last visited Oct. 5, 2004).
59 See infra notes 263, 274 and accompanying text.
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those who do not realize they are making a “copy” by emailing a digital 
file to a friend.60
Technological protection measures are, however, relatively less 
effective against the activities of seasoned hackers and highly organized 
businesses—copying engaged in by “sophisticated circumventors.” 61
Such entities are generally willing and able to fight through any 
protection, but there is no reason to believe they are less averse to severe 
civil and criminal sanctions than are average consumers. For assets with 
sophisticated audience profiles, therefore, legal sanctions remain the 
more desirable exclusionary tactic.62
II. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACES
A. A Simple Arms Race Model
The term “arms race” inevitably evokes the portentous specter of 
each of the Cold War principals investing furiously to stockpile weapons 
60
 This is called the “RAM copy doctrine.” See Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 
F.3d 96, 101- 03 (D.C. Cir. 1998); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th 
Cir. 1993).
61 See Besek, supra note 1, at 392 (“[I]t is widely recognized that TPMs can be broken quickly 
by the technologically able; these individuals can then create and distribute tools to those with 
less technological sophistication, allowing them to circumvent protection measures[, and] that 
TPMs could not be effective without legal sanctions against circumventing them or circulating 
circumvention tools.”).
62
 I do not mean to claim that, just because self-help is more effective against unsophisticated 
circumventors than it is against sophisticated ones, it is necessarily the strategy that content 
providers will use. I do mean to argue that one would expect more resources to be devoted to 
self-help where an audience of an asset is comprised largely of unsophisticated circumventors 
than one where an audience is comprised of sophisticated ones. Copyright penalties, however, 
do indeed appear to be the favored strategy for dealing with sophisticated circumventors. 
Although circumventors (mostly programmers) are probably more adept at masking their 
identity, see Dorothy E. Denning, Protection and Defense of Intrusion 25 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2004) http://guru. cosc.georgetown.edu/° denning/infosec/USAFA.html (noting that malicious 
codes can be attached to electronic mail), the costs associated with copyright enforcement 
against them are relatively similar to those associated with enforcement against 
unsophisticated circumventors. Although sophisticated circumventors may be able to “hide 
better” (thereby raising the costs of enforcing laws against them to a higher level than the costs 
of enforcing laws against unsophisticated circumventors), the need to police a smaller pool of 
people may counteract the increased per-capita burden on law enforcement associated with 
savvy evasion. 
For example, famed Russian software engineer Dmitri Skylarov was arrested after giving 
a speech about encryption at an annual hacker convention in Las Vegas. See Robert Lemos, 
Russian’s Arrest Latest in Copyright Fight, CNET NEWS.COM, http://news.com.com/2100-
1001-270129.html?legacy=cnet (last modified July 18, 2001). The case against Skylarov and 
his company, Elcomsoft, became the first in which a federal court announced that the DMCA 
did not conflict with the First Amendment. See U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D. 
Cal., 2002).
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armaments exceeding those of its adversary.63 Discussion of the causes 
and consequences of the Cold War arms race is voluminous to say the
least,64 but the term “arms race” has acquired a meaning that transcends 
its military heritage,65 colonizing political,66 legal,67 and economic 
discourse68 having nothing to do with intercontinental ballistic missiles 
or nuclear warheads. The more abstract meaning of “arms race” denotes 
the presence of (at least) two antagonistic parties acquiring similar 
resources or devices, where each party’s “armaments” are designed to 
undermine the objectives of its opponent.
A military arms race is one in which the parties are (usually) nation-
states and the stockpiled devices are weapons. Recent copyright 
scholarship speaks in terms of an arms race that similarly pits two groups 
against each other, with each group deploying either protection or 
circumvention measures so as to defeat the maneuvers of its opposition. 
Although this Article will refer to these scenarios as “technological arms 
races,” they may describe races that do not involve technology in the 
strictest sense, but rather a more expansive understanding of protection 
and circumvention measures that includes devices such as a lock, a 
63 See, e.g., RONALD E. POWASKI, RETURN TO ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, 1981-1999 (2000).
64 See, e.g., MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, INNOVATION AND THE ARMS RACE: HOW THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DEVELOP NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES (1988). Likewise, 
there has been an explosion in arms race modeling, catalyzed by L.F. Richardson’s 
posthumously published Arms and Insecurity (1960). See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); P. CHATTERJEE, ARMS, ALLIANCES, AND STABILITY
(1975); GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, TACIT BARGAINING, ARMS RACES, AND 
ARMS CONTROL (1990); ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976); KENNETH A. OYE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY
(1986); D.A. ZINNES, CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1976); 
W.L. Hollist, An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union, 21 
INT. STUD. Q. 503 (1977); Andrew Kydd, Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk 
Perspective, 44 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 222 (2000); Stephen J. Majeski & David L. Jones, Arms 
Race Modeling: Causality Analysis and Model Specification, 25(2) J. OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 259 (1981).
65 See Richard Delgado, The Language of The Arms Race: Should The People Limit 
Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961, 968 (1984) (discussing how arms-race 
terminology has colonized the way we think about a number of other issues); see, e.g., Andrew 
C. Geddis, Campaign Finance Reform After McCain-Feingold: The More Speech-More 
Competition Solution, 16 J.L. & POL. 571, 599 (2000) (discussing arms races in the context of 
elections).
66 See, e.g., MARTIN OPPENHEIRMER, URBAN GUERILLA ch. 7 (1970) (referring to a “racial 
arms race”).
67 See supra note 4 and infra note 74.
68
 This is a little misleading, since it is arguable that economic methodology, insofar as it 
explains human behavior, was brought to bear on arms race theory before arms race theory 
was self-consciously brought to bear on economic methodology. See Michael P. Leidy & 
Robert W. Staiger, Economic Issues and Methodology in Arms Race Analysis, 29(3) J. OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 503, 504 (1985).
Lee Kovarsky Pre Submission Draft, 23-Feb-04
A Technological Theory of the Arms Race 20
crowbar, or releasing a blockbuster film simultaneously across the 
world.69 Technological arms races may take place between government 
regulators and the private subjects of regulation (what is called 
“regulatory competition”)70 or, more importantly for my purposes, 
between private parties that benefit from a particular allocation of use-
and access-rights.71
Technological arms races, however, are not perfectly analogous to 
military ones. While the two share characteristics such as antagonistic 
parties and “weaponry,”72 they diverge sharply in terms of how 
prominently elements such as deterrence and politics figure into each 
party’s decision making.73 Additionally, arms race modeling concerns 
itself with predicting the incidence of two primary negative 
consequences—inefficient military investment and violent military 
conflict. Technological arms race modeling concerns itself with the 
inefficiencies that inhere in pure wealth-redistributive behavior—but 
69 The Matrix Revolutions opened simultaneously across the world—9 a.m. in New York, 
2 p.m. in London, 5 p.m. in Moscow and 11 p.m. in Tokyo —ostensibly to cement the film’s 
status as the cutting edge of motion pictures. Unless one fails to question the wisdom of 
opening a film somewhere at three in the morning, that explanation seems incomplete. What 
the “zero hour simultaneous opening of ‘Revolutions’” really represented was a protective 
counter-maneuver in response to the ease of unauthorized digital replication and distribution. 
To have released the film at a normal time in Tokyo would have guaranteed that dozens of 
file-sharing networks would have been saturated with digital albeit imperfect copies before 
most Americans woke up for breakfast. See Real Time Challenge for Matrix, BBC NEWS, Oct. 
2, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/film/3158232.stm (last visited Nov. 19, 
2003).
A similar scenario unfolded when J.K. Rowling refused to release Harry Potter and the 
Order of the Phoenix (2003) as an ebook. Avid fans took exception and divided up 
responsibility for scanning and proofreading the book. After they had finished, the scanned, 
proofread pieces were reassembled and posted on the Internet. See Jeff Kirvin, Digital 
Prohibition: Here’s Why the Proposed Laws Against File Sharing Won’t Work, WRITING ON 
YOUR PALM, Jul. 23, 2003, http://www.writingonyourpalm.net/column030721.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2004).
70 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 704-05 (2003) (discussing how 
regulated and beneficiary groups may invest and reinvest in mechanisms of influence, leading 
to a full-fledged regulatory competition).
71
 The race will generally involve somebody trying to protect the default (those deploying 
protection measures) and those that are trying to use circumvention measures to destabilize the 
default allocation of entitlements.
72
 By “weaponry” I only mean that the two parties simultaneously pursue a common 
instrumentality (weapons or protective/circumventive technology) in the process of winning 
the game.
73
 For example, military arms races also have deterrent and geopolitical consequences that 
figure prominently in response and counter-response, see Colin S. Grey, The Arms Race 
Phenomenon, WORLD POLITICS, Oct. 1971, at 39, 58, whereas those dynamics are largely 
absent from technological arms races. For a discussion on cognitive limitations of analogies, 
see M.J Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, INT’L 
ORGANIZATION 245, 248-52 (1997).
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“war” possesses no meaningful analogue in the copyright context. The 
analogy between competition over creative assets and competition over 
military ones is appropriate to the extent that the winner-take-all 
character of the “game,”74 one that is played in rounds,75 renders 
economically wasteful investment in military or technical one-
upsmanship rational for each individual player.76
So how would a technological arms race unfold in a world with 
no copyright protection? Imagine a content-provider releases each 
volume of a five-volume e-book series such that she distributes one 
installment every 2 years—so she distributes a single volume in each of 
years 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9. Also imagine a group of 100 people “consuming” 
those volumes—the “audience”—during each of years 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10. 
Each of the 100 people values every volume at $20, so every other year 
there are $2,000 in rents to be captured either by the content-provider (if 
she is able to exclude perfectly and charge each member of the group 
$20 dollars) or by content-consumers (if the content-provider’s 
exclusionary tactics fail her audience can copy freely).77 Assume for each 
period that both the content-provider and consumers can invest freely in 
technology either to protect (encrypt) the e-book (in the content-
provider’s case) or to circumvent (decrypt) the content-provider’s 
protection (in the audience’s). Finally, assume “winner take all 
conditions”—that (1) if the content-provider is “ahead” in technological 
expenditure, then she is able to charge the full $20 for the e-book and (2) 
if the two groups are “tied” or if the consumers are ahead, then the group 
may access and reproduce the work at will.78 Figure 1 represents one 
admittedly unlikely but pedagogically useful behavioral sequence:
Year Content-
provider’s
Incremental 
Investment 
in Protection
Group’s 
Incremental 
Investment in 
Circumvention
Total Cumulative 
Dollars Spent on 
Protection and 
Circumvention
1 (write volume 1) 10 X 10
2 (consume volume 1) X 10 20
74
 The “winner-take-all” character of electioneering certainly accounts for the prevalence of
arms races on the campaign trail. See Geddis, supra note 64, at 598-99.
75
 By “rounds” I mean to suggest that the players alternate decisions regarding 
military/technological spending. This is an assumption imported from the arms race literature. 
See infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
76 LEE ANDREW COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: THE STUDY OF 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION ([L- year?]); LEWIS F. RICHARDSON, ARMS AND INSECURITY
(1960).
77
 It might be helpful to think of the audience’s “rents” as units of utility derived from 
consuming the good.
78
 I state these conditions more rigorously in Section II.B, infra.
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3 (write volume 2) 20 X 40
4 (consume volume 2) X 20 60
5 (write volume 3) 30 X 90
6 (consume volume 3) X 30 120
7 (write volume 4) 40 X 160
8 (consume volume 4) X 40 200
9 (write volume 5) 50 X 250
10 (consume volume 5) X 50 300
Each time the content-provider writes a volume she invests in 
newer protection measures to try to ensure that he can sell her e-book for 
$20 per copy and each time the group consumes a volume it invests to try 
to circumvent that protection measure. After ten years and five volumes, 
the content-provider and her audience will have collectively spent $300 
on the “arms race.” This wasteful wealth-redistributive behavior could 
conceivably go on for quite some time, as each side continues to invest in 
a protection or a circumvention measure that allows it to capture all of 
the rents flowing from a given work. Assuming winner-take-all 
conditions, the cycle would only stop either (1) once the incremental cost 
of the content-provider’s protection measure exceeds the available rents 
from releasing it ($2,000)79 or (2) once the incremental cost of the 
consumer’s circumvention measure exceeds that surplus (also $2,000).80
Each maneuver does nothing to create value; it merely redistributes 
wealth between content-providers and content-consumers.
Two noteworthy inferences follow from the presence of these 
ceilings, with the second being much more important for my present 
purposes. First, ceteris paribus, arms races where the parties must split 
the rents are likely to end at smaller expenditure outlays than those 
subject to winner-take-all conditions. Dividing the rents lowers, for both 
content-providers and content-consumers, the acceptable cost ceiling of 
the “maneuver.”81 When one side is no longer willing to undertake such 
maneuvers, the wealth redistributive race is over. Second, the more 
extensive the arms race, the less the incentive to create an expressive 
79
 One of the central arguments of this paper is that people cease to rely on self-help at all 
because such exclusionary tactics would be less efficient than copyright enforcement. Assume 
for now, however, that the content-provider is limiting herself to the decision about whether or 
not to create or not under conditions where copyright protection is very thin or absent.
80
 If the cost of this surplus (the sum of the rents flowing from the asset) is distributed evenly 
across the audience, this is just the cost of the book.
81
 Consider the example in this paper. The content-provider and her audience can capture or 
share a $2,000 surplus. Under winner-take-all conditions each side is willing to spend up to 
$2,000 on protection or circumvention measures if it is confident that it will win as a result of 
such expenditure. If, on the other hand, victory produces only a fraction, say 50 percent of the 
surplus, then each side would be willing only to spend up to $1,000 on an incremental self-
help or circumvention measure.
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asset in the first place.82 From an ex ante perspective, then, arms races 
lessen creative incentives, generating a significant negative externality.83
It is worth pausing to note arms races need not necessarily create net 
economic losses. Arms races can have not only direct benefits and costs, 
but also positive and negative externalities. Arms races are economically 
undesirable only if the sum of the direct costs plus negative externalities 
exceeds the sum of the direct benefits plus positive externalities. At 
various points in this Article I contend: (1) that arms races are essentially 
rent-seeking behavior—investment that does not create value, but merely 
transfers it among different parties—and therefore have significant direct 
costs;84 (2) that contending that arms races have significant direct 
benefits requires highly contentious normative assumptions regarding 
distributive fairness;85 (3) that arms races diminish the expected return on 
82 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Technological Protections in Copyright Law - Is More Legal 
Protection Needed?, BILETA, http://www.bileta.ac.uk/01papers/loren.html (last visited Jul. 27, 
2004) (“Depending on the level of control these technological protections can provide, 
technology may allow a copyright owner to feel confident that allowing authorized distribution 
of her work in digital form, will not result in a complete loss of control and correlating loss of 
revenue.”).
83
 Paula Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer argue that, given the way the DMCA structures 
liability, content developers and distributors will have incentives to create and deploy only 
weak anti-circumvention technology. See Samuleson and Scotchmer, supra note 42, at 1640 
(“The DMCA gives no incentive for the authors to moderate their prices, and it gives little 
incentive to employ effective technical measures.”). The specific ways in which the DMCA 
does this is beyond the scope of this Section, but the implication that there may be significant 
benefits to more extravagant spending non-legal protection measures is not. Most commentary 
arguing that technological arms races generate positive externalities focus on national security 
related spillovers. See id. at n.310 (quoting Email from Peter Swire, Visiting Professor of Law, 
George Washington Law School, to Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law and Information 
Management, University of California at Berkeley (Sept. 14, 2001)) (“After [the destruction of 
the World Trade Center towers by hijacked airplanes], it is less tolerable to have a legal regime 
that encourages weak computer security and makes it illegal to push companies toward 
stronger security….”). The argument that the law should encourage advanced protection 
technology by excluding weaker protection measures from 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and § 
1201(b)(1) (2000) coverage is not persuasive. First, it is not obvious why DRM programs, 
devices designed to govern access and replication of copyrighted works, necessarily spill over 
into national security or anti-terrorist infrastructure. Second, to the extent that DRM 
technology could contribute to U.S. digital security, the need for the latter is more than enough 
to sustain demand for the former. 
84 See supra notes 64 to 83 and accompanying text.
85
 If one argues that such welfare-redistributive behavior is desirable in spite of efficiency 
losses, then that contention must rest upon the normative appeal of the redistributive outcome 
itself. I decline to engage this thorny subject, although the ultimate allocation of use-rights 
between content-consumers and content-producers remains an academic lightning rod. See 
Besek, supra note 1, at 469-70; cf. Loren, supra note 82 (“From the standpoint of copyright 
policy, this technological arms race is wasteful, at best…. A state of affairs which results in 
copyright owners investing substantial resources in the development of technological 
protections does not further that goal. Even in countries in which copyright protects is founded 
on labor or natural rights theories, the technological arms race is not within the goals of such 
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creative investment for all future content-providers, creating a significant 
negative externality;86 and (4) that commentators severely overstate the 
positive externalities (primarily military ones) associated with racing.87
As a consequence, arms races represent net social costs. Although I 
touch on all four of these values (some more extensively than others), I 
generally operate under the assumption that racing behavior is 
undesirable and that institutional actors should seek to minimize it.
B. Do Technological Arms Races Have Predictable Winners?
The preceding section presents a simple arms race scenario,88 but 
in doing so it only illustrates concepts—it does not capture empirically 
the behavior of content-providers and content-consumers. The content-
provider “player” and content-consumer “player” together represent what 
is called, in game theoretic parlance, a “dyad.”89 At least three variables, 
borrowed from international relations theory, predict the dyad’s racing 
behavior. Before delineating these variables, however, I pause to 
articulate specifically the spatial elements of the arms race metaphor and 
how they apply to copyrightable assets. 
Military arms race theories describe a relationship between 
regimes associated with territories (we usually call this combination a 
“state”). The analogue to the “regime” is obviously the relevant player, 
but what is the “territory” each regime seeks to defend or acquire? One 
might assign territory according to who is entitled by law to make what 
systems. Instead of creating and disseminating works of authorship to the public, resources are 
spent on building bigger fences and the costs of such fence building is passed on to users.”).
The arms races I discuss here should be distinguished from some of the arms-race 
literature in the patent context, which refers to a different phenomenon entirely. In much patent 
scholarship, “racing” does not refer to competition over access to an already-created asset, but 
instead to competition to create the patentable asset in the first place. In that context, therefore, 
racing behavior does have direct benefits because it may diminish the time it takes to create the 
asset and to place it in the public domain. See, e.g., David C. Hoffman, A Modest Proposal: 
Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad 
Experimental Use Exception, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1027 (2004) (arguing that the patent 
system has triggered an “arms race” that has inflated the costs of biotechnology innovation).
86 See supra notes 82- 83 and accompanying text. See also Rockwell Graphic Systems v. DEV 
Industries, 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of 
inventive incentives).
87 See supra note 83.
88 See Section II.A, supra.
89 See, e.g., Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in 
Social Dilemmas, in 3 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 51, 70 (E. Lawler ed., 1986) 
(speaking in game theoretic parlance of a dyad). One should keep in mind that each “player” is 
really a group of constituents, either content-providers or content-consumers.
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use of an intellectual asset.90 In other words, the access- and use-rights 
reserved to copyright holders under Title 17 (the portion of the U.S. 
Code housing the Copyright laws)91 represent content-providers’ 
“territory” and the use- and access-rights reserved to the public under 
that Title represent consumers’ “territory.”92 Defining the set of 
statutorily delineated use- and access-rights as the content-providers’ 
“territory” is no-doubt an imperfect conceptual maneuver,93 but it does 
have the virtue of allowing both players’ behavior to be characterized as 
either offensive or defensive, depending on the legal status of the 
contested use or access.94
The amount of literature discussing the variables that determine 
arms race behavior and predict arms race outcomes is staggering95 and 
90
 These are the use and access rights to copyrighted works as delineated in Chapter 1. Subject 
Matter and Scope of Copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122.
91 See id.
92
 This methodology labors under the realist interpretation of property as a bundle of inter-
subjective use-rights defining a “thing’s” owner’s relationships with the rest of the world. For 
the seminal statement of realist property theory, See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER 
LEGAL ESSAYS 96-97 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923). I, however, seek largely to steer clear 
of the debate about whether non-realist conceptions of property are “vulgar.” See, e.g., United 
States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945) (deriding the “vulgarity” of property-as-
thing theory); Long, supra note 45, at 540 (discussing the persistence of “thingness” in 
property theory). Suffice it to say that 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 are defined largely in terms of a 
copyright-holder’s and the public’s entitlements to do certain things with an intellectual asset.
93
 For example, this particular adaptation of the arms race metaphor, specifying “territory” 
according to the use-rights reserved for authors and those reserved for consumers, is arguably 
premised on a pre-existing allocation of use-rights, contained in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122, that is 
somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, there are questions surrounding practices such as fair use, 
where characterizing a given use as provider or consumer territory may turn on contested 
issues such as whether the practices is actually a right or a privilege. See Besek, supra note 1, 
at 415. For cases that have declined to speak in terms of a fair use “right,” See Universal City 
Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F.Supp. 
2d 1111, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
There exists a particularly problematic circularity if I do not further specify which use-
and access-rights to which I refer under Title 17. That circularity exists because the, through 
the DMCA, Title 17 now technically allocates use-rights based on a content-provider’s 
decision to use self-help; in other words, use rights are themselves determined by reference to 
what the content provider seeks to defend.
94
 Some commentators speak of technological arms races as though content-providers are only 
capable of defensive maneuvers and, conversely, as though content-consumers are only 
capable of offensive ones. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 393, 402 (1999) (“The warfare analogy of a race between offense and defense 
comes readily to mind. For those who sympathize with content providers, one can view the 
copier as the attacker, with the author responding to copying by using ‘defensive’ self-help 
systems. Then offensive techniques will arise to overcome the defenses to copying (or to 
alteration) not authorized by the author.”). The alternative is to refuse to identify “territory,” in 
which case the terms “offensive” and “defensive” lose meaning.
95 See infra notes 63- 64 and accompanying text.
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there is considerable disagreement on the degree to which anybody has 
developed a model that accurately predicts the probability of military 
conflict.96 There are, however, at least three variables that not only best 
predict when military races occur (as opposed to the war that they result 
in),97 but also happen to map quite conveniently onto a technological 
arms race model: (1) relative power, the ratio of resources one state can 
convert into military assets to the resources another has for that same 
purpose;98 (2) the offense-defense balance, the ratio of the cost of 
conquering a territory to the cost of defending it;99 and (3) the amount of 
information available to a state regarding the characteristics of its 
adversary.100 One may fairly easily convert these from variables 
predicting military arms races into variables predicting technological 
ones: (1) the players’ relative power, represented by the ratio of 
resources available to content-providers to those available to content-
consumers; (2) the ratio of the resources necessary to acquire a certain 
access or use capability relative to the costs of restricting it; and (3) the 
information available to content-providers (consumers) regarding the 
characteristics of consumers (content-providers).
I first identify the variables themselves, and then I discuss how 
different instances of these variables affect the character of racing 
behavior.101 Generally speaking, these variables operate as follows. First, 
the greater a player’s (relative) power—102its ability to invest in 
96
 There is disagreement at an even higher level of abstraction, over whether or not arms races 
increase or decrease security. See Jervis, supra note 64, ch. 3; Charles Glaser, The Political 
Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence 
Models, WORLD POLITICS, July 1992, at 497.
97 See Charles L. Glaser, When are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational Versus Suboptimal 
Arming, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2004, at 44, 51 (citing JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE 
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS ch.3 (2001)).
98 See id. (citing JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS ch.3 
(2001)).
99 See Glaser, supra note 97, at 52 (citing STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: POWER 
AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT ch. 6 (1999); Stephen Biddle, Rebuilding the Foundations of 
Offense-Defense Theory, 63 J. POL. 741 (2001); Charles L. Glaser & Chaim Kaufmann, What 
Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 1998, at 
44; Keir A. Lieber, Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and 
International Security, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 2000, at 71; Seam M. Lynn-Jones, Offense-
Defense Theory and Its Critics, 4 SECURITY STUD. 660 (1995)).
100 See Glaser, supra note 97, at 55 -57.
101
 An “instance” is simply an observed or hypothesized value for a variable. I forego the term 
“value” because it misleadingly suggests a quantitative character.
102
 Note that the product of the two player’s power levels should always be equal to one 
because they are reciprocals. If there are two players, A and B, in the dyad, then A’s power is 
Potential_Investment(A)/ Potential_Investment (B) and B’s power is Potential_Investment(B)/ 
Potential_Investment (A) where Potential_Investment(x) represents a state’s (player’s) ability 
to invest in arms (technology).
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technology—the more likely it is to so invest because that investment is 
more likely to yield victory.103 Second, a lower offense-defense ratio will 
lower the incidence of racing.104 In this scenario racing is less likely 
because, given equivalent resources, both parties will know that one 
player can defend at a lower cost than that at which the other can attack. 
Offense is irrational if it would be easily and inexpensively repelled by a 
more efficient defense. As Charles Glaser argues in a recent article on 
the danger of military arms races:
A state that suffers a power disadvantage will be able to preserve 
its defensive capability if this disadvantage is smaller than the 
extent of defense advantage. Under these conditions, the more 
powerful state should recognize its poor prospects for acquiring 
an offensive capability and therefore the limited value in 
pursuing an arms buildup. Arms levels should stabilize and races 
should be relatively short.105
Finally, information about an adversary’s motives can push a 
player towards either arms buildup or reduction.106 If a player is a 
security seeker—if it seeks only to retain the access- and use-rights 
conferred upon it by the copyright statute—and it believes its adversary 
also to be a security seeker, then the consequences of running a 
technological deficit are less severe and the advantages of 
communicating one’s own benign motives (by not arming) are larger 
than if one player thinks greed motivates its opponent.107
As I note in this Subsection’s introduction,108 the most important 
distinction between military and technological arms race models is that 
the military variety are concerned with how well variables predict not 
only racing behavior, but also armed conflict. Because warfare possesses 
no analogue in the technological arms race, I evaluate these variables in 
103 See Glaser, supra note 97, at 52. One countervailing consideration is that increasing arms 
(technology) expenditures from a position of power diminishes a player’s ability to signal 
benign motives. See id.
104 See id. at 52-53. Of course, I have defined the concept of “territory” precisely to avoid the 
problem alluded to in note 94, supra, whereby the race is defined such that authors may only 
play defense and consumers may only play offense. A more rigorous, and accurate statement 
of this principle (one that was too involved for the text), is that low offense-defense ratios 
mean that both sides are more likely to invest in defensive maneuvers. Such a scenario, 
however, likely causes races to decelerate because defensive buildups have less threat value. 
Threat value is not as necessary if the adversary is not arming offensively.
105 See Glaser, supra note 98, at 53.
106 See id. at 55-58.
107 See id. at 55-56.
108 See supra notes 72- 76 and accompanying text.
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terms of how they predict the persistence of wasteful wealth-
redistributive maneuvers.109
The content-provider/content-consumer dyad exhibits 
characteristics suggesting that, absent legal rules, sustained technological 
arms races are likely, for at least four reasons: (1) neither side enjoys a 
considerable power advantage, meaning that in the early stages of the 
race each side invests resources in maneuvers with a reasonable 
expectation that it might win;110 (2) the two players possess cognitive 
shortcomings that perpetuate racing;111 (3) transaction costs, in the form 
of coordination and identification problems, limit the ability of the two 
sides to bargain effectively or to engage in meaningful acts of 
reciprocity;112 and (4) the offense-defense ratio is low, so technological 
maneuvers tend to be decisive and yield, for each side, a payoff matrix 
that lends itself to racing.113 Before I explore each of these, I briefly 
present a short methodological framework for arms race modeling.
The most developed military arms race models incorporate 
“repeated prisoners dilemmas” (“RPDs”).114 An RPD model theorizes an 
arms race as a repetition of prisoner’s dilemma games,115 where a non-
cooperative equilibrium represents “racing” and a cooperative one 
represents “control.”116 Undesirable non-cooperative equilibria occur 
where, although it is in the dyad’s interest not to “race” (i.e. when it is in 
the collective players’ interest to “cooperate,” in traditional prisoner’s
dilemma terminology), the payoff matrix renders investing in arms 
(“defection”) the superior strategy for each player.117 The game repeats 
itself every round, leading to highly inefficient expenditures on, in the 
case of intellectual assets, protection and circumvention and, in the case 
of military assets, weapons.
1. Power Ratio May Approach One
109
 And, given the significant negative externality associated with diminished creative 
incentives, the arms races may have social costs that extend well beyond wasteful wealth 
distribution. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
111 See infra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 138-150 and accompanying text.
113 See infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text. Once prevention and circumvention 
technology exists, it is rapidly disseminated. See Loren, supra note 82.
114 See Andrew Kydd, Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective, 44 AM. 
J. OF POL. SCI. 228, 229 (2000).
115 See GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, TACIT BARGAINING, ARMS RACES, AND 
ARMS CONTROL (1990); KENNETH A. OYE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986); ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
116 See Kydd, supra note 114, at 228.
117 See Leo F. Smyth, International Mediation and Capitulation to the Routine, 108 PA. ST. L. 
REV. 235, 253-54 (2003).
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Mutual uncertainty about the identity of the victor means that 
neither player, content-provider nor content-consumer, is likely to 
concede during the early stages of an unchecked arms race.118 Each 
player will find investment in “arming” rational unless both sides 
perceive the same winner.119 The ratio of the ability of content-providers 
to channel these resources to the ability of consumers to do so is the 
technological analogue of the power ratio in the arms race literature.120
Although this article has thus far spoken in terms of two 
“players,” each one of those is itself comprised of a large, heterogeneous 
group of people.121 Because both content-providers and content-
consumers are competing for the same rents (those flowing from 
distribution and use of the asset, respectively),122 determining which side 
is more “powerful” reduces to the question of which group can more 
effectively channel its dispersed resources into efficient maneuvers. The 
content-provider player’s power is easier to analyze because its 
organization and investment tends to be transparent and corporate in 
nature,123 whereas consumer power flows from technological activity that 
is both opaque and ideologically motivated.124 The opacity and economic 
irrationality of the consumer player renders its component of the power 
ratio very difficult for observers to quantify and even more difficult for 
the content-provider player to respond to.
Content-providers are repeat players and tend to have contacts 
with sophisticated distributors in possession of broad, cheap licenses to 
118
 For discussions of attempts to evaluate one’s own relative power, See Steven Van Era, Why 
States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 
D.C., 1988). For how organization theory figures into player decisionmaking, see JACK L. 
SNYDER, IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSIVE: MILITARY DECISION-MAKING AND THE DISASTERS 
OF 1914 (1984); BARRY R. POSEN, SOURCES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE (1984); TREVOR N. 
DUPUY, A GENIUS FOR WAR: THE GERMAN ARMY AND GENERAL STAFF, 1807-1945 (1977)
119
 Additionally, the two players would probably have to perceive similar payoff matrices.
120 See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
121 See also Snyder, supra note 118. 
122 See supra Section I.C., infra.
123 See id.
124 See infra note 127. The hacker movement may be further subdivided into those hackers 
who seek to steal and those that operate with a genuine sense of moral duty to flout copyright 
restrictions. See The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Apple’s iTunes & The Digital Free 
Lunch: Steve Jobs, Others Force Clarity in Content Debate, 
http://www.pff.org/pr/pr0603TCSClarity.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) (“Who are the 
‘resisters’? There are the ‘morally obtuse’ who want free stuff or feel a ‘vandalistic itch’, and 
there is the ‘more complex, more ideological and more important’ group who ‘assert not only a 
right but a duty to make all systems for enforcing intellectual property rights untenable, and 
regard breaking protects as a public service.’”).
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use protection measures (such as encryption).125 Content-consumers, on 
the other hand, are a large, disorganized bunch that must overcome more 
significant organizational costs.126 An inexhaustive list of their 
organizational disadvantages includes more difficulty in: identifying 
other consumers in the same medium (with the same interest in 
circumvention), contacting such consumers, setting up a communications 
infrastructure, fairly distributing the costs and benefits among members 
of the group, defining group preferences, and maintaining adequate 
technological distribution channels. 
These transaction costs are similar to the impediments that 
handicap consumers in the legislative process, but consumers overcome 
them in the technological arena more effectively than they do in the 
political one.127 Ideologically motivated hackers may be willing to incur 
costs in developing circumvention measures that far exceed their 
individual valuation of access to a work.128 More persuasively, however, 
many of the disadvantages cited above derive from precisely the 
condition that this analysis suspends—the presence of law.129 If one 
could assume away vicarious penalties for producing otherwise 
infringing technology, one should expect considerably more coordination 
on the part of consumers and, although the content-provider interest 
would remain more concentrated, the infrastructural and organizational 
gap between the two players would diminish significantly. Because so 
many variables are in play, predicting which side—content-providers or 
consumers—would prevail in a lawless world is very difficult. And, as 
noted above, arms races arise where there exists uncertainty regarding 
125 See Christopher Jenson, The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: 
Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 543-44 (2003).
126 See Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 
48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 23-24 (2003); see also Jenson, supra note 125, at 544 (noting that 
consumers are unsocialized to “copyright culture”). Moreover, content consumers consistently 
confront the collective action problem, whereby free-riding forestalls activity that would be in 
the group interest. See Olson, infra note 132, at 159-60 (making this argument in general, not 
with content consumers in mind); Wu, supra note 70, at 748.
127 See Wu, supra 70, at 747 -51 (arguing that technological strategies are superior because they 
do not implicate collective action problems to the same extent as do their political 
counterparts).
128
 One particularly amusing account of the hacker ideology explains that they range along an 
axis of good and evil, with the ones engaged in illegal hacking considered “dark side hackers,” 
and, by implication, that their law-abiding counterparts considered “an elite force of Jedi 
Knights.” See Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement Of Cybercrime On The Electronic 
Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 73 n.88 (2001). 
129
 One of my central arguments is that copyright constrains arms races that would otherwise 
persist unchecked. In order to analyze whether arms races would persist unchecked in the 
absence of copyright, I must, of course, suspend the existence of that legal right. See 
Subsection II.C.1, infra.
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the economic ability of each antagonist to sustain its competitive 
participation in the race.130
2. Cognitive Limitations
What may matter most to a given player in a given round, 
however, is that round’s perceived payoff matrix.131 A fully rational actor 
might be capable of incorporating the future behavior of its adversary 
into its current “move” (decisions whether or not to race), but neither the 
group of content-providers nor the group of content-consumers is such a 
monolithic, rational actor.132 Shortsighted and impatient players are more 
likely to precipitate arms races because, by considering their adversaries’ 
behavior only in that round, they distort their perceived payoff matrix in 
favor of uncooperative defection.133 Some have termed this myopia “the 
fallacy of the last move.”134
The ideological bent of the hacker movement suggests that 
content-consumers may be more susceptible to the fallacy of the last 
move than are content-providers,135 but because both “players” are 
actually comprised of a large, highly differentiated set of individual 
actors—each constituent of which is also subject to that fallacy136—the 
proposition that either player has the cognitive capacity to incorporate its 
adversary’s future behavior into its spending decisions is a dubious 
one.137
Cognitive limitations may figure more prominently in 
technological arms races than they do in military ones because, as 
opposed to content-providers or consumers, governments are centralized 
decision-makers. Centralized decision-makers are far more likely than 
their decentralized counterparts to consider systematically both an 
130 See Kydd, supra note 114, at 229.
131
 Although the two may be highly correlated.
132 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, 59-60 (1965) (“In a large, 
latent group there will be no tendency for the group to organize to achieve its goals through the 
voluntary, rational action of the members of the group, even if there is perfect consensus.”).
133 See Kydd, supra note 114, at 230.
134 See Herbert F. York, Military Technology and National Security, SCIENTIFIC AM., August 
1969, at 26.
135
 This is so because hackers may not be exhibiting economically rational behavior. See supra
note 124.
136
 There is also reason to believe that each constituent of the set is unnecessarily optimistic 
with respect to the ultimate probability of success (possessing an “optimism bias”), increasing 
the likelihood that the groups will continue to race. See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, 
Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 223-224 
(2003).
137 See R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 42-49 (1982) (discussing the effects of group scale 
on achieving political objectives)
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adversary’s response and their own positioning in subsequent rounds. 
These cognitive limitations should be distinguished from the third 
concept discussed below, informational deficiencies, because they 
concern the players’ inability to analyze strategies and potential payoffs 
rather than their ability to acquire information about opponents’ 
intentions.
3. Impediments to Cooperation/Reciprocity
Military arms races can result in any number of outcomes—
some of them, such as war, more disfavored than others. A subset of 
these outcomes are products of cooperative strategies, including agreed 
termination at parity,138 resolution of political differences,139 and 
reciprocity,140 that require levels of coordination and communication, 
both between and within players, that is unobtainable in the copyright 
context. Each of these outcomes requires that both players—again, 
themselves comprised of an enormous set of people with heterogeneous 
preferences—coordinate and enforce their collective will, an unlikely 
scenario in light of (1) difficulties and transaction costs that inhere in 
coordinating and monitoring such a large group141 and (2) the presence of 
ideologically motivated, uncooperative hackers.142
Moreover, these cooperative outcomes would require each player 
in the dyad to possess an unrealistic set of information about the motives 
of the other. Even though a player might favor defection when facing its 
normal payoff matrix, if the collective inferiority of repeated defection 
becomes apparent to both players, they could together pursue one of 
these three cooperative strategies in order to increase the expected 
payoff. Informational deficiencies,143 as distinguished from cognitive 
limitations in the preceding subsection,144 contribute significantly to 
players’ likely failure to reach these types of cooperative outcomes.
Arms race theory predicts that racing and conflict are less likely 
the more confident each player is that the other is behaving defensively 
138 See Colin S. Gray, The Arms Race Phenomenon, WORLD POLITICS, Oct. 1971, at 39, 69.
139 See id. at 70.
140 See Kydd, supra note 114, at 240.
141 See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
142 See Loren, supra note 82 (“The level of cracking that occurs re sults in a greater investment 
in stronger technological protections. In turn, this higher level of protection translates into 
even more efforts expended to crack those technological protections. For some in the hacker 
community, utilizing stronger protections merely constitutes a greater challenge to determine if 
someone can crack the heightened scrutiny.”).
143 See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
144 See Subsection II.B.2, supra.
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rather than greedily.145 The organizational dynamics of each player in the 
content-provider/content-consumer dyad, however, render distilling a 
singular motive practically impossible. First, different constituents of 
each group will self-evidently possess different motives. Where some 
consumers may seek statutorily protected use and access, such as to 
reverse-engineer it for interoperability,146 others may seek that same 
access to reproduce it illegally.
Second, and of equal importance, identifying whether a given 
move is greedy or defensive is difficult, even for an individual content-
provider or content-consumer. For example, if a content-provider 
deploys a technological protection measure that constrains copying, then 
that device may both restrain unauthorized reproduction in violation of 
section 106(1)147 (defensive) and constrain fair use that is authorized 
under section 107148—such as time-shifting (offensive).149 Conversely, if 
a consumer acquires a decryption program to gain access to a work
(defensive), then that program may both enable access to 
uncopyrightable material and unlock expression at the core of Title 17 
protection (offensive).150 The inability of players to acquire reliable 
information, coupled with their inability to coordinate a response once 
they have it, dramatically reduces the incidence of cooperative strategies 
in technological arms races.
4. The Undamped Quality of the Race
Perhaps the most important predictor of racing behavior is how 
“damped” a race is. Military arms races are “damped”151 when the cost of 
forces necessary to conquer a piece of territory far exceed the cost of 
145 See Glaser, supra note 97, at 56 -58.
146 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (establishing 
that reverse-engineering for the purposes of achieving interoperability constitutes fair use).
147
 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
148
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
149 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983) (failing to find contributory 
infringement because the primary activity in question, time shifting, is fair use). An author 
would also be acting “offensively” if it sought to use technological protection measures to lock 
up works in the public domain. See Loren, supra note 82 (“For example, nothing prohibits the 
use of technological protections for works that are in the public domain. Hamlet, The Tale of 
Genji, The Iliad, and The Odyssey could all be distributed in encrypted form utilizing these 
technological protections with coding for read-only, copy-never.”).
150
 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) sets forth the specific subject matter of copyright protection.
151 See Gray, supra note 138, at 57. This phenomenon is captured by what many academics 
term the “offense-defense balance.” The pioneering work on the offense defense balance is 
Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, 30(2) World Politics 167 (Jan. 1978).
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forces necessary to defend it.152 Under these conditions, effective 
offensive maneuvers become more expensive than effective defensive 
ones, considerably arresting the velocity of the race.153 When significant 
investment in armaments (or technology) adds little to the ultimate 
probability of victory,154 one can expect to observe very slow-moving, 
less inefficient races.155
At least in the digital era, the race between content-providers and 
content-consumers is largely undamped, a condition that serves to 
magnify the benefits of defecting (racing).156 In real-space one must 
generally pay for each lock and each crowbar, meaning that marginal 
investment in developing either of those items guarantees neither 
unrestricted access to the resource (in the case that the crowbars 
outnumber the locks) nor perfect exclusion (in the case that the locks 
outnumber the crowbars). In the digital environment, however, the 
conditions are close to winner-take-all. Reproduction of digital locks and 
crowbars is generally so inexpensive that the costs of developing the 
device, rather than the costs of re-building it (digitally replicating it), 
constitute most of the overall outlay for the “maneuver.” One decryption 
152 See Glaser, supra note 98, at 52. I adopt Glaser’s precise definition of offense-defense 
balance. See Glaser & Kaufmann, supra note 99, at 46 (“[T]he offense-defense balance should 
be defined as the ratio of the cost of the defender’s forces . . . .”). 
153 See id. at 56.
154
 Although all definitions of the offense-defense balance attempt to capture the relative 
likelihood of “offensive” success, the precise ratios vary by author. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, 
WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 62 (1981) (alternately defining conditions of 
offensive advantage as obtaining where (1) the defense must spend more to defend a territory 
than offense must spend to acquire it and (2) where the cost of capturing the territory are less 
than the value of the territory itself); Jack S. Levy, The Offensive/Defensive Balance of 
Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis, INT’L STUDIES Q., June 1984, at 
219, 222-30 (defining offensive advantage in terms of the characteristics of the weaponry the 
principals possess); Jervis, supra note 151, at 178 (stating that offense enjoys the advantage 
when one players offensive maneuvers are cheaper than its defensive ones); Stephen W. Van 
Evera, Causes of War 78 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 
1984) (arguing that offensive advantage exists where a significant amount of territory is likely 
to change hands as a result of the war). These definitions are catalogued in Glaser and 
Kaufman, supra note 99, at 50.
155
 I say “less inefficient” not only to double negate myself unnecessarily, but the phrasing 
“more efficient” might mislead one to believe that arms racing is, in some absolute sense, 
socially desirable. High velocity races are less efficient because each side expends 
considerable resources on maneuvers and counter-maneuvers in a relatively short period of 
time.
156
 When the advantage of offense increases (maneuvers are more likely to be decisive), then 
military stability diminishes (inapplicable here), states cannot simultaneously enjoy 
considerable stability, and arms races will intensify because offensive maneuvers necessitate 
more expensive defensive maneuvers to counteract the. See Glaser & Kaufman, supra note 99, 
at 48-49.
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program can defeat the three encrypted files about as cheaply as it can 
defeat three million. 
And if the race is winner-take-all, then even mildly increased 
spending on maneuvers or counter-maneuvers can dramatically affect the 
payoff matrix and, hence, both the desirability of defection and the 
incidence of racing. Players are willing to defect in order to invest in 
decisive maneuvers—in much the same way that players defected to 
invest in decisive weapons systems such as Dreadnought battleships 
before World War I and atomic weapons during the Cold War.157
C. An Inter-Modal Division of Labor
Now I turn to the most important element of the Article—the 
relationship between copyright law and arms races. In this Section I 
argue that this relationship exhibits two distinctive characteristics, with 
the second remaining, up until now, unarticulated in the copyright 
literature. First, copyright law constrains the magnitude, if not the 
velocity,158 of technological arms races. Second, arms races are 
inefficient because they cannibalize any benefits flowing from an 
author’s ability to select an optimal mix of copyright enforcement and 
self-help. I refer to the dynamic whereby copyright more effectively 
excludes sophisticated circumventors and self-help more effectively 
excludes unsophisticated ones as an “inter-modal division of labor.”
1. Copyright Protection Constrains Arms Races
The preceding Section identifies four conditions suggesting that, 
in a copyright-less world, a protection and circumvention measures race 
could persist indefinitely until either content-providers’ investment in 
self-help (scenario 1) or content-consumers’ investment in circumvention 
(scenario 2) exceeds the rents flowing from the creative work. In 
scenario 1 a content-provider, when faced a decision regarding whether 
or not to create a work, would be indifferent—she could either forfeit the 
rents by not creating it or she could spend an amount equal to that sum 
by restricting access to it. In scenario 2 a content-consumer is indifferent 
between circumventing the protection measure and purchasing the work 
in its protected state.
Now relax the assumption that there exists no copyright 
protection. A content-provider will not invest prodigiously in self-help 
157 See Kydd, supra note 114, at 230.
158
 By “velocity” I mean the rate of investment per unit of time.
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(rent-seek) beyond the value of the available rents, but she will invest up 
until the point where she is indifferent between expending resources on 
another technological protection measure and privately enforcing her 
Title 17 rights. Copyright therefore provides a ceiling on the amount a 
content-provider, ex ante, may expect to expend on self-help. She can 
always be expected to pursue the lowest cost method of exclusion, and if 
the cost of copyright enforcement is equal to or less expensive than that 
of self-help, she will cease to make incremental investments in the latter.
In other words, once the incremental costs of a self-help strategy 
reach the incremental costs of copyright enforcement, an arms race ends 
because content-providers will always favor the less expensive 
exclusionary tactic. Content-consumers will likewise cease investing in 
circumvention because buying the asset legally becomes less expensive 
than circumventing protection measures.159 Copyright, then, puts a 
ceiling on the wealth-redistributive inefficiencies that technological arms 
races create.160
2. Dividing Labor
Recall from the introduction to this Subsection that self-help and 
copyright protection constitute what I term an “inter-modal division of 
labor”—each exclusionary mode operates most effectively against a 
different audience profile. The audience for copyrightable goods is 
comprised of a large group of unsophisticated circumventors and a much 
smaller group of sophisticated ones. Loosely speaking, copyright 
enforcement is effective at excluding exceptional, sophisticated 
infringers and self-help is effective at excluding average, unsophisticated 
ones.161 For ideologically motivated, sophisticated circumventors, stiff 
159
 In fact, if the penalties are large enough, one would expect that content-consumers would 
not race at all. This is because the “cost” of circumvention is actually the cost of the maneuver 
plus its expected penalty.
160
 This is not entirely true because one would expect authors to spend on self-help when 
copyright protects their interests imperfectly, but they would only spend on self-help up until 
the point where that expenditure, added to the cost of copyright enforcement, equals the 
magnitude of the surplus that the author may capture from producing and disseminating the 
work.
Some would argue that a pure self-help regime might preserve sufficient creative 
incentives to encourage content-providers to place works in the public domain. The 
supplemental investment necessary to maintain the effectiveness of self-help, however, would 
eventually undermine this argument. Copyright law, then, both constrains the inefficiencies 
arising from the races themselves and limits the corrosive effect the races can have on creative 
incentives.
161
 An inventor’s choice between patent protection and self-help may be distinguished because 
that decision is driven primarily by the inherent reverse-engineerability of the patentable asset. 
In other words, an inventor chooses between self-help and patent protection based on the 
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legal penalties are a much stronger deterrent than is the next generation 
of encryption. For unsophisticated circumventors, the first generation is 
more than sufficient.162
Arms races undermine the inter-modal division of labor because 
they effectively null the set of accidental and unsophisticated 
circumventors. Hackers outfit formerly unsophisticated circumventors 
with state-of-the art crowbars,163 and the cost of excluding these newly 
armed content-consumers using self-help bears a direct relationship to 
their level of access to sophisticated circumvention tools. The formerly 
unsophisticated circumventor, equipped with state-of-the-art 
circumvention devices, effectively becomes a sophisticated one. 
Therefore, as the costs of non-legal exclusion rise, content-providers 
will, even for unsophisticated circumventors previously excluded cost-
effectively by self-help, eventually favor copyright enforcement. 
Content-providers will no longer be able to divide labor by cost-
effectively directing self-help against one set of people and copyright 
enforcement against another.
Arms races, then, tend to cannibalize the benefit of having a two-
track system for ensuring supra-competitive pricing. They eliminate 
entirely self-help’s comparative advantages, so laws aimed at 
constraining arms races represent attempts at ensuring that society 
efficiently exploits non-legal protection measures for controlling 
unsophisticated circumventors.
III. DOCTRINAL AND STATUTORY EVIDENCE
degree to which distribution of end-products discloses the intellectual asset. See also Paul 
Veravanich, Rio Grande: The MP3 Showdown at Highnoon in Cyberspace, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 433, 472 (2000) (“However, it is conceivable that a 
sophisticated hacker could invent around a copy protection measure and distribute the music 
online in the same manner that is occurring today with unauthorized MP3s. Physical deterrents 
to unauthorized copying of original recordings will prevent the average consumer from 
distributing unauthorized copies of original works.”).
162
 A brief digression on the unique dynamics of the “circumventor” interest may at this point 
be in order. Each audience member is willing to spend on circumvention technology up to the 
value she gets from her access to creative works. Each individual audience member, however, 
does not create circumvention devices on her own because such efforts would be grossly 
redundant. Instead, consumers pool resources for and share the benefits of developing the 
device. The devices themselves, however, are created by a distinct and dramatically smaller 
pool of people (generally by hackers, but sometimes by less negatively stereotyped groups) 
and are distributed to consumers.
163 See Loren, supra note 82 (“First, a technological arms race results from the interaction of 
copyright owners employing technological protections and the hacker community seeking to, 
and succeeding in, cracking through those protections.”); see also Veravanich, supra note 161, 
at 472 (“If the past is any indicator of future developments, diligent hackers and pirates will 
ultimately circumvent anti-copying technology.”).
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In this Part I develop two major institutional themes. Both will 
emerge as I explore arms races in three different contexts: arms races 
over copyrightable assets, over patentable assets, and over access to 
information as adjudicated in what I refer to collectively as the “digital 
trespass cases.”164 Although each theme is distinct enough to warrant 
identification and discussion, neither one finds categorical support in the 
history of legal institutions mediating access to and use of intangible 
assets.
First, I argue that, although the DMCA does represent a 
significant development with respect to copyrightable goods, it actually 
conforms very neatly to a series of legislative and judicial responses to 
competition over a variety of other intangible assets.165 In many of these 
contexts, the relevant court opinions and legislation dove-tail predictably. 
The dominant institutional reaction to arms race phenomena are what I 
call “damping responses”—responses that depress the offense-defense 
ratio by diminishing the offensive payoffs and increasing the defensive 
ones.166 Courts and Congress, however, also adjust other variables, 
including power ratios and informational deficiencies, to arrest the
velocity of arms races.167
164
 These cases are eBay v. Bidders Edge, 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe 
v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 
(Cal. 2003); Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
165
 The “arms-race,” while the vogue-ish object of recent scholarly attention, has for some time 
influenced rules in copyright and in other legal contexts. Although technological arms races 
are increasingly frequent, the following examples should illustrate that they are an older 
phenomenon than the explosion of post-DMCA arms race references would lead one to 
believe. I omit some noteworthy examples. For example, earlier technological protections used 
printed paper that blurred when someone photocopied from it. Early distributors of VHS 
technology used tracking codes that made VHS tapes grainy when people copied them. See 
Loren, supra note 82. We think of arms races as “device-centric” (rather than “strategy-
centric”), but self-help tactics have historically come as much in the form of crude monitoring 
strategies as they have in the form of “technology.”
166
 The term “damped” implies that the payoffs to either offense or defense are such that one of 
those strategies is clearly inferior. In this discussion, however, when I allude to “damping 
responses” I refer primarily to those that favor defense.
167
 As discussed in Section II.A, one may conceptualize an arms race as a game where, in each 
period, the previously inferior group develops enough technology to displace the technological 
superiority of the previously dominant group. In the next period the formerly dominant group 
is inferior and must itself invest enough in technology to defeat the superiority of the formerly 
inferior group.
Congress or the judiciary may interrupt this potentially endless cycle by prohibiting (1) 
the use of exclusionary measures (technology that would be deployed by owners to constrain 
access and copying), (2) the use of circumvention measures (technology that would be 
deployed by content-consumers to enable access and copying), or (3) the use of both (1) and 
(2). Congress could also employ at least two other strategies that I do not discuss here. They 
could proscribe nothing, or they could favor consumer offense and defense. Strategy 1 would 
tip the scale dramatically in favor of the consumer player, as both the content-provider player’s 
payoffs for defense (self-help to preserve its (non-DMCA) Title 17 rights) and offense (self-
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Second, I argue that the prevailing wisdom, that Congress is 
unflinchingly aligned with content-providers and the courts with content-
consumers,168 is a gross oversimplification. Although this 
characterization may be directionally correct, it is, as a categorical 
matter, unjustified. Courts have actually left content-providers with quite 
a bit of doctrinal weaponry and Congress does not get enough credit for 
its generosity towards consumers. In fact, in the context of copyrightable 
and other intangible assets, courts have done precisely what the DMCA 
does—allocate certain use and access rights to an asset on the basis of 
what an owner does with it, rather than on the basis of that asset’s 
content or the use the circumventor seeks to secure.169 In these contexts, 
however, courts and legislatures have confronted competition between 
two corporate entities, rather than along a corporate-consumer axis. A 
more precise statement of the DMCA’s novelty, then, is that it contains 
the only arms race rule that allocates access- and use-rights as between 
creator and consumer categorically.
help to limit fair use and access to uncopyrightable material) diminish. Strategy 2 would have 
precisely the opposite effect – to tip the scale in favor of content-providers, increasing the 
payoff to content-provider offense and content-provider defense. Strategy 3 would be most 
akin to complete elimination of power at parity. Neither side may (legally) invest in offense or 
defense. One could argue that it slows the velocity of the race by forcing players to adopt less 
decisive maneuvers. By prohibiting “protection” and “circumvention” measures, Congress 
would inevitably re-focus the attention of content-providers on cruder, less cosmetically 
“technological,” protection measures, such as ushers at movie theatres.
168 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983) (failing to find 
contributory infringement because the primary activity in question, time shifting, is fair use); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1626 (2001) (“In many of the new technology cases, courts faced with 
what appeared to be all-or-nothing attempts at copyright enforcement preferred to interpret the 
statute in a way that would leave the copyright owners with nothing. Congress, however, has 
readjusted the balance by imposing a compulsory license scheme that permitted continued 
distribution of the new technology, while assuring payment to copyright owners.”).
169
 I do not mean to imply that there are no substantive requirements for the underlying asset. 
Trade secret law protects only economically valuable material and DMCA protection cannot 
be triggered unless a content-provider has sought to protect a portfolio of assets, at least one of 
which must be copyrightable.
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A. Copyrightable Assets170
1. The DMCA171
The DMCA—passed into law in 1998—represents copyright 
law’s most conspicuous institutional response to arms race phenomena. It 
contains provisions prohibiting, with very narrow exceptions,172 two 
types of behavior. First, the DMCA prohibits circumvention of access 
controls, defined as technological measures that effectively control 
access to a work protected under Title 17 (I will refer to these as the 
“anti-circumvention” provisions).173 The DMCA also prohibits 
trafficking in certain devices whose primary purpose is either to 
circumvent those access controls174 or to circumvent rights controls,175
with “rights” defined as a right incorporated under Title 17 (I will refer 
to these vicarious liability rules as the “anti-trafficking” provisions).176
Although these provisions are more nuanced than the following skeletal 
description may suggest,177 generally speaking, if a content-provider 
deploys technological self-help, then she becomes entitled to a cause of 
action delineated in the DMCA. Professors Samuelson and Scotchmer, in 
an article to which I refer in Part I,178 attack the DMCA as creating 
irrational incentives for more primitive anti-circumvention measures,179
but such incentives make sense in light of the inter-modal division of 
labor I describe in Section I.C. The DMCA properly encourages cheap 
170
 I omit discussion of one particular example of an “arms race,” one where only some of the 
maneuvers are “technological” in any meaningful sense, involves concert bootlegging. Though 
not a perfect substitute, recorded performances can displace demand for live attendance. 
Advances in digital technology have decreased the cost of producing and distributing the 
substitute and the cost of distributing it. Faced with activity that threatened to curb 
dramatically the demand for live performances, musicians sought to control access to the 
substitutes primary input—the concerts themselves.
Congress formulated a sui generis form of protection in 17 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000) by 
imposing criminal penalties for illegally bootlegging live performances.
171
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
172
 A party may circumvent an access control if: it is a nonprofit library determining whether to 
acquire a work; it is engaged in law enforcement activities or security testing, it is engaged in 
reverse-engineering to achieve interoperability, it is engaged in encryption research; it is 
attempting to prevent access of minors to certain material on the Internet; it is uncovering and 
disabling an undisclosed information-gathering feature. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(i).
173
 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
174
 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
175
 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1).
176
 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b).
177
 For example, there is a complex rulemaking procedure prescribed for creating exceptions to 
§ 1201 liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
178 See supra notes 42- 43 and accompanying text.
179 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra 42, at 1641.
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self-help because the marginal costs of more sophisticated encryption do 
not significantly enhance control over unsophisticated circumventors—
less extravagant measures are sufficient.180 In other words, incentivizing 
cheap self-help makes sense given the audience that content-providers 
must exclude from access to and use of creative assets.
If the costs of copyright enforcement stay relatively constant 
over the spectrum of audience sophistication (which I argue they do)181
and if the cost of self-help declines along with the sophistication of 
circumventors, then a regime that facilitates cost-effective self-help is 
preferable to one in which content-providers may use only copyright 
enforcement—that is, as long as arms races do not inflate the costs of 
self-help. Legal rules that do not constrain arms races ultimately render 
self-help an inefficient exclusionary tactic. The DMCA addresses this 
problem through its anti-circumvention rules and its secondary liability 
provisions.
Although there is little empirical data on the distribution of 
technological sophistication across content-consumers,182 the DMCA 
implements a regime that squares nicely with some intuitions about what 
that distribution probably looks like. If the vast majority of content-
consumers are unsophisticated circumventors, then a regime that 
incentivizes more primitive, less expensive protection can inexpensively 
constrain mass infringement as long as the government can effectively 
impede the flow of circumvention technology from hackers to 
consumers.183 That regime remains effective because moderate self-help 
constrains the dominant source of infringement for that asset, 
unsophisticated circumventors.
180 See Veravanich, supra note 161, at 172; cf. Section III.B, infra (discussing this principle in 
the context of patentable assets).
181 See supra note 62.
182 See Burk, supra note 4, at 172-73.
183 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).
The DMCA also allocates the institutional burdens of ensuring supra-competitive pricing 
between the public and private sector, and it does so in a predictable way. In furnishing legal 
protection for the installation of protection measures, See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(a)-(b) 
(prohibiting circumvention of technological protection measures), as with wooden fences, the 
DMCA effectively asks the private sector to bear the costs of containing unsophisticated 
circumvention. Congress does not require content-providers to adopt protection measures the 
way it does with the Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”), See 17 U.S.C.A. § 1002(a), but it 
provide sufficient legal penalties for breaking such protection measures that it is strongly in the 
interest of most content-providers to include them rather than to rely on copyright protection. 
In providing severe sanctions for compromising these protection measures, as it does with 
burglary and more severe trespass laws (that violate circumvention of the fence rather than 
trespass itself), the government assumes much of (but not all of) the cost of enforcing 
copyright-type rules against sophisticated infringers (The government also provides stiff 
criminal penalties of up to ten years for deliberate infringement meeting some financial 
thresholds. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (b)(2).
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The main critique of the DMCA is that it eliminates arms races 
at the public’s expense by punishing circumvention of almost any
technological protection measure, even if that measure governs access to 
material that is largely uncopyrightable or if it restricts exercise of 
privileges reserved for content-consumers in various parts of Title 17.184
Congress, in effect, made it easier for content-providers to engage in 
both offense and defense—the DMCA’s anti-circumvention and 
secondary liability provisions furnish a license both to prevent 
consumers from infringing and to restrict activity such as fair use to 
which the copyright laws had previously privileged the public. 185
The DMCA is therefore a damping response, albeit an unusual 
one. Congress damped the race for content-provider territory by 
significantly diminishing the payoff (increasing the penalty) for 
consumer offense. It provides causes of action and penalties for using 
crowbars to get around digital locks. The development to which many 
scholars take exception is how dramatically the DMCA tips the scales in 
favor of content-provider offense against consumer territory.186 While 
this circumstance indeed merits serious attention, these commentators 
overstate the novelty of the DMCA’s liability provisions. They do so first 
by ignoring DMCA provisions that protect consumer territory187 and 
second by failing to recognize a legal precedent in the relationship 
between patent and trade-secret law.188 I explore the latter failure further 
in Section III.B.
2. Contributory Infringement
184 See Besek, supra note 1, at 466-67; id. at 475-78 (detailing criticisms of the DMCA); Laura 
N. Gasaway, Anti-Circumvention: A View from Librarians and Educators, in ADJUNCTS AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS, JUNE 13-17, 2001, at 
103 (Jane C. Ginsburg & June M. Besek eds., 2002); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS 
AND COPYWRONGS 177-79 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital 
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 519 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA needs to be modified to accommodate fair use 
privileges).
185
 The DMCA lacks any broad fair use defense, instead providing a number of specific, 
narrower exemptions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
186
 In fairness to Congress, however, one should not be to quick to dismiss the DMCA as a 
piece of special interest legislation, as it does include a variety of mechanisms, including 
rulemaking procedures, that appear designed to preserve some access- and use-rights. These 
exceptions, however, tend to be worded as privileges to circumvent, rather than rights to do so, 
and therefore run the risk of sparking the arms races discussed in Part II, supra.
187 See, e.g., § 1201(d)-(g) (detailing exceptions to liability).
188 See Section III.B, infra.
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Under Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc.,189 a copyright 
holder possesses a cause of action against those who manufacture certain
goods incapable of substantial non-infringing uses.190 Sony synthesized 
and updated what is called “contributory infringement” doctrine, a form 
of a secondary copyright liability. The Sony Court, however, held that 
recording broadcast television qualified as time-shifting within copyright 
law’s fair use exception.191 The Sony Court, therefore, agreed with 
Universal City Studios in principle only—a manufacturer could be guilty 
of infringement on the basis of what people do with its product—but 
found that what people actually did with the VCR was not infringement.
Forget for a moment the specific facts involved in the Sony case 
and focus on the rule itself. In the absence of a penalty for the 
dissemination of staple goods without substantial non-infringing uses,192
content-providers would have two options, with only the first being 
economically sustainable: (1) a self-help strategy and (2) legal action 
against direct, rather than vicarious or contributory infringers.193 And, if 
content-providers were forced to resort to a self-help strategy, then that 
strategy would ultimately be met with a consumer counter-strategy, 
precipitating an arms race. And, recalling the analysis from Section II.B, 
that arms race would ultimately render self-help an economically 
implausible exclusionary option.
Contributory infringement doctrine constrains racing because it 
affords a content-provider a cause of action as an alternative to increased 
spending on technological counter-measures.194 By imposing legal 
liability for disseminating circumvention technology, contributory 
liability effectively increases the input costs of consumer offense by 
increasing the expected penalty. Moreover, by interrupting the flow of 
technology to unsophisticated circumventors, contributory infringement 
189
 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983) (failing to find contributory 
infringement because the primary activity in question, time shifting, is fair use).
190 See id. at 442.
191 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
192
 The current circuit equivocation regarding “willful blindness,” compare In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003), with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2004), has spawned a number of network 
counterstrategies that seek to shield the identities of community members. See Brian Krebs, 
Copyright in the Digital Age: Online Piracy Spurs High-Tech Arms Race, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A34439- 2003Jun26 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2004) (“In the past six months alone, no fewer than 50 new versions of 
‘peer-to-peer,’ or P2P file-trading software programs have emerged on the Internet. Unlike 
some of the most popular services like Kazaa and Grokster, many of them try to shield the 
identities of their users with password protected networks, encryption, and other tools.”).
193 See Section I.B., supra.
194 See Hardy, supra note 2, at 250-51.
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doctrine preserves the audience composition necessary for self-help to 
remain cost-effective. 
As the Sony facts195 and the rash of recent peer-to-peer file-
sharing cases196 illustrate, the development and dissemination of 
circumvention technology has been an engine behind mass 
infringement.197 It is no accident that, for the most part, the wording of 
the DMCA’s vicarious liability provisions echoes that of the Sony
decision.198 Unlike the DMCA’s treatment of circumvention, however, 
the Sony contributory infringement rule represents a more conventional 
damping response. It disfavors consumer offense and, using penalties, 
dramatically decreases the net payoff for infringement. It does not, like 
the DMCA, increase the offense-defense ratio for consumer territory. 
3. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”)199
195
 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983) (failing to find contributory 
infringement because the primary activity in question, time shifting, is fair use).
196 See, e.g., In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (finding that willful blindness associated with 
deliberately encrypted communications was tantamount to constructive knowledge for 
contributory infringement analyisis); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding contributory infringement for client-server model network filesharing service); 
Grokster, 259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (failing to find constructive knowledge where network did not 
have knowledge of and ability to stop actual acts of infringement at the time they occurred).
197
 Again, Sony found that the primary activity, time-shifting, did not constitute infringement. 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 443-56. With respect to Sony, then, this proposition should read “allegedly 
infringing.” This fact does not diminish the claim here, however, because the focus my inquiry 
is on the formulation of the contributory infringement doctrine rather than its specific 
application to facts.
They further illustrate the ways in which the arms race model set forth in Section II.A is 
something of an oversimplification. Just as every consumer with a VCR did not invest the 
resources in developing the technology herself (she just bought it), contributory infringement 
doctrine represents a publicly owned, low-cost legal countermeasure. Of course the copyright 
owner still has to pay for her own litigation, just as a circumventor may have to license (even 
if very cheaply) circumvention technology.
198
 The wording is slightly different, with the DMCA promulgating a considerably lower 
threshold for a finding of vicarious liability. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 418 (“[S]ale of 
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute 
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(2) (2000) (“(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; (B) has only 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title; or (C) is marketed 
by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for 
use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.”).
199
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010.
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Much has been made of the DMCA’s access and copyright 
control provisions as evidence of Congress’s fidelity to content-
providers,200 but Congress adopted consumer-friendly arms race 
legislation well before the passage of the DMCA in 1998. During the 
early 1990’s many industry insiders expected digital audio tape (“DAT”) 
recording machines, devices playing cassette tapes delivering digital 
sound quality, to displace the audiocassette as the dominant music 
format.201 The recording industry voiced considerable concerns regarding 
the recorder’s ability to make perfect, but potentially unauthorized,
digital copies.202
Recall that in Sony the Court reformulated the contributory 
infringement doctrine, but declined to impose liability because it 
declared that VHS recording of broadcast content fell within copyright’s 
fair use exception.203 Fearing a fate worse than Sony, content owners, in 
conjunction with hardware manufacturers, developed the Serial Copy 
Management System (“SCMS”) for use with DAT machines.204 The 
SCMS system was a self-help measure that restricted consumers to first-
generation copying only.
The AHRA, passed in 1992, requires that all digital audio 
recording devices be equipped with SCMS and,205 like the DMCA, it 
prohibits circumvention of a technological protection measure, the 
SCMS system.206 Whereas the DMCA ultimately privileges the interests 
of content-providers,207 in the AHRA Congress promulgated an arms 
race preclusive scheme that in some ways favors consumers.208 First, The 
200 See, e.g., Matthew Scherb, Free Content’s Future: Advertising, Technology, and Copyright, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1787, 1821-22 (2004) (“Regardless of the anti-circumvention provisions in 
the [DMCA] that might keep the deep linkers and framers from defeating content owners' 
measures, is the cat and mouse game, the software arms race, a desirable outcome?”); Philip J. 
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 
564 (2003) (“The complications arise, nonetheless, because companies may be able to use 
encryption technology in an ‘arms race’ to make it more difficult for rivals to gain access to 
their protected standard or pursue litigation under the DMCA to combat legitimate reverse-
engineering.”).
201 See Veravanich, supra  note 161, at 450.
202 See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-873(II)).
203
 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983) (failing to find contributory 
infringement because the primary activity in question, time shifting, is fair use).
204 See ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT CASES AND MATERIALS
807 (6th ed. 2002).
205
 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000). 
206
 17 U.S.C. § 1002(b).
207 See Subsection III.C.2, infra.
208
 The express purpose of the AHRA was to allow the consumers to access the new media 
format without jeopardizing the legitimate rights of the recording industry. See Veravanich, 
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AHRA requires that the SCMS system prevent only “serial copying,”209
allowing users to make first-generation copies. Traditional copyright 
law210 privileges nothing about first generation copying—it must qualify 
under some other part of the statute as non-infringing reproduction.
Second, the AHRA prohibits content-providers from initiating 
infringement actions based on the manufacture and use of DAT 
machines, effectively shielding manufacturers from judicially developed 
contributory liability rules.211 It also bestowed upon consumers immunity 
from certain types of noncommercial copying.212 These provisions meant 
that consumers and equipment manufacturers faced few impediments to 
engaging in what would have been, under traditional copyright law, 
fairly clear cases of direct and contributory infringement.213
In arms-race terminology, the AHRA mandated content-provider 
defense both by requiring installation of self-help devices and by 
articulating standard of legal protection for those deploying them.214 In 
so doing Congress acknowledged that leaving copyright protection to be 
determined by the efficacy of protection and circumvention measures 
may lead to wasteful arms races.215 Rather than leaving the devices to 
fend for themselves, Congress imposed dramatic punitive costs on 
countermeasures.
What is exceptional about the AHRA is that it addresses one 
piece of territory—first-generation copying—by dramatically favoring 
consumer offense over provider defense. Technological arms races will 
be slow-moving not only when offense-defense ratios are very low, but 
also when they are very high. Situations with extraordinarily high 
offense-defense ratios are not treated extensively in military arms race 
literature because it is fairly obvious that, if the offensive player is 
inclined to attack, then a rational defensive player will simply cede the 
territory. The AHRA, in fact, creates just such an offense-defense ratio. 
supra note 161, at 451 (citing Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 1623, 28 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2188, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3609 (Oct. 28, 1992)).
209
 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
210
 By “traditional” I simply mean non-sui generis forms of copyright protection.
211
 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
212 See Besek, supra note 1, at 213.
213
 The AHRA implements a system that is actually a little more complicated. It taxes the 
manufacture and importation of DAT machines and storage media and distributes these levies 
to copyright owners according to a complicated royalty rate. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07. This 
amounts to a crude compulsory license, as the royalty scheme reimburses copyright owners for 
estimated infringement of their copyrights. Nonetheless, the AHRA appears quite pro-
consumer on the whole.
214 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2001).
215 See id. That same term Congress also outlawed “black boxes,” devices used to decode 
encrypted satellite and cable transmissions. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (2000)
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The sine qua non at the heart of the AHRA’s legislative compromise is 
what amounts to a compulsory license for consumer occupation of 
content-provider territory, the first-generation digital reproduction of 
musical compositions.216
The DAT recorder and the AHRA now amount to no more than a 
footnote in the history of digital music distribution, as the DAT became 
obsolete shortly after Congress passed the relevant legislation.217 The 
AHRA nonetheless remains an important legislative artifact because it, 
along with anti-cable-descrambling legislation,218 was perhaps the first 
Congressional protection for a mass-media “control” device. Its 
influence on the DMCA is undeniable: (1) it is the only DMCA 
antecedent to use the word “circumvent” in its statutory text219 and (2) 
both the DMCA Senate and House Reports explicitly cite the AHRA as 
statutory precedent for the anti-circumvention model.220 The two pieces 
of legislation remain connected, as several recent amici briefs have cited 
the AHRA as anti-circumvention legislation superior to the DMCA.221
4. The Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”)222
A fourth example of a technological arms race involves the 
evolution of cable programming during the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s.223 The 
back-and-forth between the players in this provider-consumer dyad is 
particularly illustrative because (1) lawmakers were extremely hesitant to 
use copyright law to mediate broadcast communications (so we can 
observe racing behavior over an extended period of time)224 and (2) the 
race proceeded in discreet, identifiable “rounds.” During the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s the cable dish emerged as an attractive means of 
216
 Of course consumers ultimately foot part of the bill in the form of increased component 
prices, but statutory immunity is effectively a compulsory license for consumer offense.
217 See Veravanich, supra note 161, at 451 (citing Wayne Bledsoe, Consumer Graveyard 
Filled with Fossils of Technology, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 17, 1998, at 5).
218 See Subsection III.A.4, infra.
219 See Besek, supra note 1, at 437 n. 211.
220 See id.
221 See Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Yochai Benkler and Professor Lawrence Lessig in 
Support of Appellants and Reversal of the Judgment Below, Universal City Studios v. Corley, 
2001 WL 34106428 (2d Cir.).
222
 It is worth noting that although the object of the race was copyrightable cable content, the 
Cable Communications Policy Act was not treated as a creature of copyright policy, as 
evidenced by its placement in Title 47, rather than Title 17. See 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
223 See Samuel Rosenstein, The Electric Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and Satellite 
Descramblers: Toward Preventing Statutory Obsolescence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1459-
1462 (1992).
224
 This hesitation was further evident in the ultimate legislative solution which, again, does 
not appear in Title 17. See 47 U.S.C. § 553.
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receiving satellite media transmissions.225 Many dish owners eluded 
monthly cable charges by intercepting signals intended for local cable 
affiliates.226 Responding with a famous technological counter-maneuver, 
programmers deployed “descramblers” (or “black boxes”) and broadcast 
their content in a form visually unintelligible to any consumer without 
one.227
Scrambled programming quickly begat unauthorized black 
boxes, at which point Congress finally interrupted the technological 
escalation with The Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”),228 a 
set of rules governing broadcast and interception of scrambled content.229
The statute states that nobody “shall intercept or receive or assist in 
intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a 
cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable 
operator.”230 The statute specifically defines “assisting” as 
“manufactur[ing] or distribut[ing] [] equipment intended … for 
unauthorized reception.”231
The CCPA contains elements that should now be familiar: (1) a 
rule against direct circumvention and (2) a secondary liability provision. 
The CCPA’s secondary liability rule resembles those in the DMCA,232
the AHRA233 and contributory infringement doctrine.234 With respect to 
this Part’s first major theme, that the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provisions are not quite so “unprecedented,” the CCPA generally, and its 
vicarious liability provisions in particular, self-evidently foreshadow the 
DMCA’s anti-trafficking provisions.
With respect to the second theme, the alleged Congressional 
favoritism towards content-providers, the CCPA’s set of cosmetically 
content-provider friendly rules may be a red herring. The CCPA’s 
secondary infringement rule has less bite than does its DMCA 
counterpart,235 as it contains an additional intent requirement.236 The 
CCPA, moreover, is not housed in Title 17 and it does not appear that 
Congress thought in terms of the provider-consumer axis that animates 
many of the institutional responses in copyright law. Owners of the cable 
225 See id. at 1459.
226 See id. at 1460.
227 See id. at 1461.
228
 17 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000).
229 See id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000).
233
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1002(c) (2000).
234
 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1983).
235 See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000).
236 See id. at § 553(a)(2).
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content were squared off not against consumers, but against satellite dish 
distributors. Congress was more likely concerned with which corporate 
interest was going to steward the dissemination of audio-visual content, 
rather than with whether the CCPA’s allocation of use- and access-rights 
was sufficiently favorable to consumers.
B. Patentable Assets
The relationship between patent and trade secret protection 
almost mirrors the post-DMCA relationship between copyright and self-
help. The distinction between paradigmatic patentable and copyrightable 
assets has blurred slightly in recent years but, generally speaking, patent 
law protects inventions237 and copyright law protects expression.238
Although the degree of similarity exhibited by the two intellectual 
property forms remains a matter of considerable academic dispute,239
both represent a grant of exclusionary authority to promote private 
creation.240 Many describe patent as a “bargain” between the public and 
the inventor, affording the latter limited exclusive rights in exchange for 
placing an invention in the public domain.241 The academic consensus is 
that copyright represents an incentive to do the same with creative 
assets.242
Patentable assets vary dramatically with respect to their inherent 
reverse-engineerability. Although a number of patents issue for things 
such as the revolving door—where the circulated product inherently 
discloses the patentable asset (the idea)—some issue for assets, such as 
industrial processes, that do not.243 Software notwithstanding, most 
copyrightable assets, on the other hand, are easily reverse-engineered. 
Securing a return on copyrightable assets almost always requires the 
content-provider to circulate copies disclosing the original expression, so 
237 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a) (2000) (requiring that an invention be "new and useful" and 
nonobvious in order to receive patent protection).
238 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107-122 (2000) (requiring copyright protection for "original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" but with various limitations on 
exclusive rights).
239 See, e.g., Long, supra note 45 (comparing information cost profiles of copyright and 
patent).
240 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright law, 
like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration…. It is said that 
reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his 
creative genius.”).
241 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
242
 For a catalogue of Supreme Court cases describing copyright in this fashion, see supra note 
19.
243 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (holding that a patent could issue for 
an industrial process incorporating computer program control based upon an algorithm).
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another important variable—the sophistication of the asset’s consumers—
dictates the content-provider’s optimal mix of self-help and copyright 
protection.
Where a patentable asset is more technically complex and 
difficult to reverse-engineer (distributing the end-product does not enable 
the audience to reproduce substitutes for the patentable asset easily), one 
can expect inventors of that asset to forsake patent prosecution244 in favor 
of trade-secret protection, an alternative exclusionary regime whereby 
inventors actually trigger legal protection by engaging in a modicum of 
self-help.245 In other words, the absence of the need to distribute easily 
reverse-engineerable substitutes for certain patentable assets accounts for 
the greater incidence of secrecy as a mode of exclusion in that context.246
What is nonetheless striking about the relationship between 
patent and trade secret law is that their complementarity almost mirrors 
that of copyright and self-help after the DMCA.247 The DMCA does not, 
technically, delineate copyright violations,248 but instead imposes 
liability for circumventing a technological protection measure restricting 
access to a copyrightable asset.249 While the analogy is imperfect,250 the 
244
 The term “prosecution” merely describes the process of procuring a patent from the Patent 
and Trademark Office.
245
 When securing a return does require disclosure of the asset itself, however, one can expect 
an inventor to favor patent protection over self-help when dealing with sophisticated 
audiences. See Smith, supra note 45, at 1175 (“In the case of land, fences and other boundaries 
must be easily processed by a lay audience – anyone might stray onto the land – but, in the 
case of patents and the possibility of a nonexpert inadvertently ‘trespassing’ on a patent is less 
likely. Highly detailed and patent-specific information is not only indispensable, but the 
limited audience of potential violators can be expected to process it.”).
246
 It is worth noting that an asset need not meet all the technical requirements for patentability 
(e.g., novelty, non-obviousness, and utility) in order to remain squarely within the scope of 
trade secret protection.
247
 For a more in-depth discussion of the DMCA, see Section IV.A, infra.
248
 One may best conceptualize the DMCA instead as legal protection from technological 
protection. See Loren, supra note 82. (“Adequate legal protections f or technological 
protections also reduce the likelihood for an “arms race,” avoiding the wasteful investment in 
bigger and better technology. While providing legal protections for these technological 
protections will not completely end the technological arms race -- there will always be hackers 
-- it should slow the pace of the arms build-up.”).
249 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2002). 
250
 Trade secrets actually protect any intellectual asset where the conditions of “secrecy” have 
been met, irrespective of whether it is patentable or not. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-
5 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (Supp. 1990). At least some portion of the protected 
material must be copyrightable, however, for circumvention to trigger the penalties of the 
DMCA. This distinction, however, is less significant than it might first appear. Because the 
determination of copyrightability is generally made only after the initiation of litigation 
(authors don’t have to register copyrights), see 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000), in practice the DMCA 
serves to protect a significant amount of material that may not satisfy the requirements of 
copyrightability, such as the idea/expression dichotomy, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
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DMCA is copyright’s digital trade secret law. An asset qualifies for trade 
secret protection after its creator takes “reasonable” measures to ensure 
its secrecy. One difference worth noting, however, is that only 
economically valuable material may be protected under trade secret law 
(although I should not overstate this difference, as a content-provider 
cannot invoke the DMCA without the presence of some copyrightable 
constituent in the set of protected material). Much like the allegedly 
“unprecedented” anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,251 trade 
secret law defines legal obligations not mainly by reference to an asset’s 
underlying contents, but primarily by reference to what the inventor does 
to protect them.252
For example, in E.I. DuPont deNeours & Co. v. Christopher,253
DuPont, the plaintiff, had developed a highly secret, but unpatented 
process for producing methanol.254 Securing a return on the process did 
not require DuPont to place the process itself in the public domain.255
The defendants hired aerial photographers to take fly-over photographs 
of Dupont’s methanol plant.256 Because the asset (the process for 
producing methanol) was not easily reverse-engineered from the 
associated end-product (methanol), Dupont had taken steps to keep the 
process secret, but did not patent it.257 In a colorful opinion 
characterizing the defendant’s activity as “cloak and dagger” industrial 
espionage, the Fifth Circuit found for DuPont on the grounds that the 
defendants had used “improper means” to obtain the trade secret.258
Revealing concerns that allowing such activity would damp 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form 
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
251
 These are found in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b).
252
 Trade secret rules are exclusively a creature of state law, primarily because there is no 
enumerated constitutional authority for Congress to legislate. In 1979 the legal community 
produced a set of non-binding, model trade secret laws, called the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA). UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-5 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (Supp. 1990). 
Currently, the District of Columbia and forty-one states have adopted some form of legislation 
modeled after the UTSA. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 statutory 
note (1995).
A trade secret, as defined by the U.T.S.A. is something of “economic value ... from not 
being generally known ... and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain secrecy.” See U.T.S.A. §(4). This definition is quite broad and can 
encompass almost anything. See id.
253
 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1970).
254 Id.
255 Id. At 1016.
256 Id. at 1013.
257 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (“One who discloses or uses another’s trade 
secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence 
reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.”).
258 See DuPont, 431 F.2d at 1013.
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innovation,259 the court quipped acerbically, “[p]erhaps ordinary fences 
and roofs must be built to shut out incursive eyes, but we need not 
require the discoverer of a trade secret to guard against the unanticipated, 
the undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of espionage now 
available.”260 If that remark were made in reference to copyrightable 
material rather than a trade secret, it could have been ripped straight from 
transcripts of congressional hearings on the DMCA.261
In a passage remarkably evocative of my argument that self-help 
is inefficient for certain audience profiles,262 the DuPont court concluded 
that 
[a]lthough after construction the finished plant would have 
protected much of the process from view, during the period of 
construction the trade secret was exposed to view from the air. 
To require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to 
guard its secret would impose an enormous expense to prevent 
nothing more than a school boy’s trick.263
The notion that extravagant protection measures represent inefficient 
wealth-redistributive expenditures reappears in subsequent trade secret 
jurisprudence.
In Rockwell Graphic Systems v. DEV Industries, Judge Richard 
Posner embarks on an even more explicit articulation of the way trade 
secret law checks technological arms races.264 Rockwell Graphic 
Systems manufactured printing presses and some printing press parts for 
newspapers.265 Rockwell, however, did not always manufacture the parts 
and would routinely subcontract the manufacturing of the “piece parts” 
to third party vendors.266 In so doing Rockwell necessarily divulged to 
the relevant vendor the specifications for the piece part. Rockwell had 
employed two employees in more senior positions where they had access 
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See Report of the Senate Judiciary Comm., S.Rep. No.105-190 (2d Sess. 1998); Report of 
the House Judiciary Comm., H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, Part 1 (2d Sess. 1998); Report of the 
House Commerce Comm., H.R. Rep. No.105-551, Part 2 (2d Sess. 1998); Joint Explanatory 
Statement of the Comm. of Conference, H.R. Rep. No.105-796 (2d Sess. 1998). For an 
extended treatment of this legislative history, See David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative 
History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 
(2002).
262 See supra notes 150-162 and accompanying text.
263 DuPont, 431 F.2d at at 1016-17.
264
 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
265 Id. at 175.
266 Id.
Lee Kovarsky Pre Submission Draft, 23-Feb-04
A Technological Theory of the Arms Race 53
to piece part drawings. Those employees both defected from Dupont and 
joined DEV in the mid 1970’s.267 Rockwell brought a trade secret suit in 
1984 upon discovering that DEV possessed 100 of Rockwell’s 
drawings.268 The central issue in the case was whether Rockwell tried to 
keep the piece part designs secret “hard enough” to warrant trade secret 
protection.269 The magistrate and district judges both held that the piece 
part drawings did not constitute trade secrets because, by distributing 
piece part drawings to the vendors, Rockwell made only minimal efforts 
to keep them secret.270
In overturning the district court, Judge Posner catalogues 
Rockwell’s process for restricting access to the piece part drawings to 
authorized personnel only.271 Citing Dupont, Posner elaborates on a 
conception of trade secret protection that protects socially valuable 
information against otherwise lawful conduct.272 That conception, Posner 
notes, “emphasizes the desirability of encouraging inventive activity by 
protecting its fruits from efforts at appropriation that are … sterile 
wealth-redistributivenot productiveactivities.”273 What the activity 
Posner derisively characterizes as “wealth redistributive” is the same 
activity that public choice literature derisively characterizes as rent 
seeking, and it is the same activity to which I refer when I speak of 
inefficient arms racing over access to intellectual assets.
Concluding his opinion, Posner directly echoes the reasoning of 
the DuPont passage cited above, as well as the underlying logic of why 
copyright law may seek to encourage minimal, but only minimal, levels 
of self-help:
Patent protection is at once costly and temporary, and therefore 
cannot be regarded as a perfect substitute. If trade secrets are 
protected only if their owners take extravagant, productivity-
impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to 
invest resources in discovering more efficient methods of 
production will be reduced, and with it the amount of 
invention.274
267 Id. at 176.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 176-77.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 178.
274 Id. at 180.
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In this short passage Judge Posner captures directly the problems 
with protection and circumvention races over patentable assets, and his 
analysis applies with equal force to races over copyrightable ones. Arms 
races over any intellectual asset impose direct costs in the form of 
“sterile” wealth-redistributive activities and impose negative externalities 
in the form of diminished incentives to create.
The DuPont and Rockwell decisions reinforce one of this Part’s
major themes and refine another. First, these opinions both represent 
judicial attempts to constrain unnecessary self-help expenditures by 
punishing circumvention of even primitive protection measures. 
Moreover, they both damp racing behavior by imposing considerable 
costs on consumer offense.
Second, although the DuPont/Rockwell arms race approach is 
pro-inventor, it is hardly anti-consumer. In a copyright context public 
choice theorists might decry such a categorical allocation of access- and 
use-rights, triggered by even rudimentary protection, as naked special 
interest legislation.275 In the patent/trade secret context, however, such 
vitriol is not forthcoming. In that context the race may pit two corporate 
interests against each other, rather than a corporate steward against 
consumers. Industrial espionage lacks the normative appeal of fair use, 
so one might explain DuPont/Rockwell’s categorical approach to access-
and use-rights by noting that, in the trade secret context, there exists no 
direct consumer interest to protect.
C. Other Informational Assets“Digital Trespass” Cases
Courts have had to confront races over access to intangible assets 
on fronts other than that of intellectual property. In one particular 
context, involving what I refer to collectively as the digital trespass 
cases,276 courts wrestled with the degree to which racing justifies 
allowing network owners to regulate access to information contained on 
and passed through private servers.
Section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts delineates two 
sources of liability for trespass to chattels: either for “dispossessing 
another of the chattel” or for “using or intermeddling with a chattel in the 
275 See, e.g., Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Unconstitutional Patent in Disguise: Did Congress 
Overstep Its Constitutional Authority in Adopting the Circumvention Provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 33, 36 (2002) (“The Copyright Act is 
increasingly becoming a piece of special interest legislation with specialized provisions to 
please almost every special interest group and lobbyist.”).
276
 These cases are eBay v. Bidders Edge, 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe 
v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 
(Cal. 2003); and Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
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possession of another.”277 More importantly for my purposes, the 
Restatement affords to the chattel-holder "a privilege to use force to 
defend his interest in its exclusive possession."278 The Restatement, 
however, does not vest in an owner a cause of action for harmless 
intermeddling with his chattels.
The Restatement distinguishes between, on the one hand, a 
possessory interest in real property and, on the other, a possessory 
interest in chattels, by furnishing a real property holder an action for 
nominal damages and a chattel-owner a limited self-help privilege. The 
Restatement treats these interests differently because it regards the self-
help privilege as a sufficient means of protecting the inviolability of a 
chattel.279 The Restatement's selective use of the self-help privilege 
obviously reflects one of this Article’s central academic conceitsthat 
institutions do and should encourage self-help when that is the more 
efficient means of regulating access to and use of an asset. 
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions280 announced the arrival of the 
digital trespass to chattels theory. Cyber Promotions sent unsolicited 
spam, over the CompuServe network, to CompuServe customers.281 A 
number of these customers began to complain and subsequently 
terminated their relationship with Compuserve.282 Compuserve attempted 
a self-help measure by blocking the spam, but that maneuver failed.283 It 
then sued Cyber Promotions. The court held that a plaintiff could 
properly state a claim for trespass to chattels over electronic signals, even 
if the server could bear the increased traffic-load associated with the 
spam.284 The CompuServe court also held that, since Cyber Promotions’s
activity compromised CompuServe’s reputation and customer goodwill, 
CompuServe could identify sufficient economic losses to sustain the 
trespass to chattels claim.285
The CompuServe court issued an injunction against Cyber 
Promotions, justifying that legal remedy by reference to the failure of 
CompuServe’s exercised self-help privilege.286 The court specifically 
stated that, where reasonable measures could be effective, self-help was 
277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
278 Id. § 217 cmt. a.
279 Id. § 218 cmt. e.
280
 962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
281 Id. at 1023.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1019.
284 Id. at 1022.
285 Id. at 1023. The precedent for the “reduced economic efficiency” argument comes from 
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
286 See CompuServe, 962 F.Supp. at 1023.
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“particularly appropriate in this type of situation and should be exhausted 
before legal action is proper.”287 This remedy obviously reflects the same 
logic as do the DMCA’s provisions granting a cause of action against 
infringers if they circumvent a content provider’s self-help. The 
CompuServe court, echoing the appeal of an inter-modal division of 
labor,288 explicitly endorsed the notion that self-help should be used 
where it is cost-effective. 
Nonetheless, in CompuServe, the court nominally justified 
exercise of the self-help privilege by reference to defense of a tangible 
assetthe servers. Consistent with the judiciary’s historical aversion to 
propertizing information,289 the CompuServe court seemed weary of 
positing a propertarian relationship between CompuServe and its 
customers’ email addresses.290
Whether or not this historical trend explains why the 
Compuserve court came out the way it did is subject to debate, but 
several years later, in the now-famous eBay v. Bidder’s Edge case,291 a 
federal district court strained even further to avoid positing a propertarian 
relationship between the owner of a network and information housed on 
it. eBay confronts, much like the intellectual property law in the 
preceding Sections, arms races over intangible property. What is so 
interesting about the case is that, because courts so intensely disfavor 
finding property rights in factual information, the eBay court addressed 
the arms race phenomenon without speaking in terms of the intangible 
property interest actually at stake.
Scholarship has characterized the parties’ behavior in eBay as a 
wasteful “game of cat and mouse,”292 another way of expressing the 
arms-race dynamic. Ebay is perhaps the Internet’s best-known auction 
site, and Bidder’s Edge was an auction “aggregator.”293 As such, 
Bidder’s Edge did not itself administer auctions, but instead maintained 
information on current prices across a number of auction sites.294
Bidder’s Edge attempted to negotiate access to query the eBay site, but 
the negotiations languished when the two sides could not agree on the 
287 Id.
288 See Section II.C, infra.
289 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991).
290
 Congress responded to the problem of unsolicited spam in the Controlling the Assault of 
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM Act”), Pub. L. No. 108-
187, 117 Stat. 2699, 2719 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713).
291
 eBay v. Bidders Edge, 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
292 See David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341, 
350 (2004).
293
eBay, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1061.
294 Id. at 1061-62
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frequency with which Bidder’s Edge was to execute the queries.295
Bidder’s Edge nonetheless continued to query the site, and eBay 
responded by identifying and blocking 169 IP addresses they believed to 
be Bidder’s Edge servers.296 Bidder’s Edge, in turn, resorted to using 
proxy servers—a technique allowing them to circumvent the IP Address 
restrictions imposed by eBay.297 At that point, eBay sued Bidder’s Edge 
on a trespass to chattels theory.298
The eBay court granted a preliminary injunction on the likely 
success of that theory, but did so without acknowledging a propertarian 
relationship between eBay and the bid information.299 The case was not 
ultimately tried because the parties settled after the preliminary 
injunction issued. The court, however, did remark in its decision issuing 
the injunction that “the gravamen of the alleged irreparable harm is that 
if [Bidders Edge] is allowed to continue to crawl the eBay site, it may 
encourage frequent and unregulated crawling….”300 Although the court 
seemed to contemplate that such activity might result in irreparable harm 
to eBay’s site,301 one might just as easily expect eBay to use increasingly 
sophisticated technology to block IP addresses and, in turn, other meta-
auction sites to use increasingly sophisticated proxy server technology to 
circumvent eBay’s restrictions.
The eBay court identifies the property interest at stake as one in 
the future integrity of eBay’s servers.302 In so doing, it obscures what 
Bidder’s Edge was really trying to acquire and what eBay was really 
trying to protect—information about the items for which Bidder’s Edge 
was seeking to query the site. The eBay court was not in a position to be 
frank about the factual, intangible character of the property over which 
the parties were racing, but it was in a position to stop the racing itself—
provided it could articulate an alternative property interest. Seizing on 
the CompuServe court’s rationale, at least one commentator has 
suggested that the eBay court should have alternately premised its 
injunction on the failure of eBay’s self-help efforts.303
Such a position may well have been more honest, because it 
appears as though that was precisely what the eBay court was doing—
stemming the escalating measures and counter-measures race between 
295 Id. at 1062-63.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 1067.
299 Id. at 1067.
300 Id.
301 See id.
302 See id.
303 See McGowan, supra note 292, at 351.
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eBay and Bidder’s edge over bid information. It was only the doctrinal 
impracticality of owning up to the real property interest at stake that 
prevented the eBay court from confronting the arms race issue explicitly.
The digital trespass cases are yet another context in which legal 
institutions have had to confront racing behavior. More importantly, the 
eBay rule, like the DMCA, allocates entitlements to information without 
reference to the content of the information or reference to the use for 
which the circumventor seeks it. Nonetheless, the eBay rule, like the 
CCPA and trade secret law, resolves issues along a corporate-corporate 
axis, rather than a corporate-consumer one. The most interesting 
revelation of the digital trespass cases is that, as opposed to competition 
over access to the previously discussed assets, they represent a unique 
situation where the interest of constraining arms races does not dovetail 
with the traditional protection of a conventional creative or inventive 
asset. Courts generally have either constitutional or statutory authority to 
protect creative and inventive assets, but not information. Perhaps this 
splintered interest accounts for why courts so obviously strain under the 
weight of existing doctrine and why legislatures, precedentially 
unconstrained, can act so decisively.
CONCLUSION
The “technological arms race” is a classic example of 
terminology that became accepted legal wisdom before it was 
sufficiently scrutinized. The sheer number of arms race references in the 
DMCA literature alone would cause any causal observer to presume the 
phenomenon had been theorized to death, but in fact that scholarship is 
nonexistent. Few academics have explored the more general relationship 
between copyright law and arms racing, and none have either (1) 
attempted to set forth a rigorous theory analyzing racing behavior or (2) 
sought to position the phenomenon’s most conspicuous institutional 
response in the broader context of legal rules governing other intangible 
assets.
Despite the lack of serious academic consideration given to 
technological arms races, rigorous analysis bears out several of the 
crucial scholarly assumptions. Most importantly, an analytic framework 
borrowed from international relations theory indeed suggests that, in the 
absence of legal rules constraining them, the 21st century creative 
marketplace would be beset by inefficient, wealth-redistributive arms 
races.
Confirming that which the literature assumed, however, was only 
one half of my task. I also sought to contextualize the DMCA, first by 
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arguing that one of copyright’s most fundamental functions is to 
constrain technological arms races and, second, by comparing its 
enactment to other institutional developments where courts and 
legislatures have confronted arms racing over other intangible assets.
